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A "COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE" AS A GOAL
OF INCOME TAX REFORM
Boris I. Bittker *
Taking issue with those who contend that the income on which
taxes are paid should be the same as what an economist would con-
sider "net income," Professor Bittker urges that a neutral, scien-
tific measure of taxable income is a mirage. In many of the vexed
areas of income definition, the concept of economic income yields
no help; in others, it implies results from which even its propo-
nents would recoil. There is no touchstone for tax reform: propos-
als must be considered provision by provision and policy by policy,
on their particular merits.
S INCE World War II, our ablest commentators on federal in-
come taxation have repeatedly attacked the "exceptions,"
"preferences," "loopholes," and "leakages" in the income tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and have called upon
Congress to reverse the "erosion of the income tax base" caused
by these "special provisions." It is no exaggeration to say that
a "comprehensive tax base" (hereafter CTB) has come to be the
major organizing concept in most serious discussions of our fed-
eral income tax structure. This theme dominated the Tax Re-
vision Compendium published in 1959 by the House Committee
on Ways and Means and the hearings based on this collection
of papers; it inspired the "optional simplified method" recently
proposed by Senator Long; its exploration is a major task of the
Special Committee on Substantive Tax Reform of the ABA's Tax
Section; it was a major Leitmotiv in the responses of economists
and others when the Joint Economic Committee in 1965 asked
them to comment on the "fiscal policy issues of the coming dec-
ade"; and discussions of federal income taxation written for, or
by, the nonexpert but interested citizen have brought it to the at-
tention of a wider public.'
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Cornell, 1938; LL.B.,
Yale, 1941.
I am very grateful for the comments and criticisms of Alan R. Bromberg, Marvin
Chirelstein, and Joseph A. Pechman, who read a draft of this article.
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Some of this discontent with "preferences" and "leakages" has
focused on the economic or social shortcomings of the particular
provision under discussion; but increasingly a different line of
argument has become popular. This approach accepts the ration-
ale advanced in defense of the "preference," at least arguendo, but
goes on to assert that equally persuasive arguments may be offered
in support of virtually all other "preferences," including many
that are still embryonic. Moreover, it is argued, a tax concession
is a poor way to distribute a government bounty or to encourage
activities that are in the public interest: the value of the conces-
sion varies with the beneficiary's tax status, the impact of the
program may be erratic and unpredictable, its cost cannot be ac-
curately estimated or budgeted in advance, and its operation is
covert rather than open to public inspection and criticism.2 The
only road to a simplified and improved tax structure, it is con-
tended, is to eliminate "preferences" ruthlessly, no matter how
persuasive or seductive their individual appeals may be, and to
impose the tax on the resulting CTB. The broader base will per-
VISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE (Comm. Print i959)
[hereinafter cited as 1959 COMPEND=IU]; House Committee on Ways and Means,
Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revision, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (i96o) [herein-
after cited as Y959 Panel Discussion] ; S. 3250, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (2964) (Long
proposal), reprinted in Bittker, An Optional Simplified Income Tax?, 21 TAX L.
REV. 1, 37-51 (I965); Report of the Section of Taxation on Substantive Tax Re-
form, go ABA REP. 289 (i965); Galvin, Progress in Substantive Tax Reform,
U. So. CAL. I965 TAX INST. 1; JOINT EcoNOMIC COMMITTEE, 89TH CONG.,
ISr SEss., FISCAL POLICy ISSUES OF THE COMING DECADE (Comm. Print 1965);
D. BAZELON, THE PAPER EcoNomy 144-68 (1963); J. HELERSTEIN, TAXES, Loop-
HOLES, AND MoRAts (1963); P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY RAIm (1964).
2 An offsetting advantage of tax concessions is that they leave taxpayers with
greater freedom than some governmental programs; it was this, I take it, that led
some advocates of a CTB in 1962 to favor the investment credit rather than a sub-
sidy as a means of encouraging economic growth. Another premise that seems to
be buried in the CTB approach is that "preferences" are not nullified by the market;
a corollary is that the revenue gain to be achieved by eliminating preferences can
be estimated without adjusting for changes in the pretax income to be received
under the new tax structure.
It is odd that so many economists are advocating a "neutral" income tax base in
the classroom at the same time that they are striving to persuade Congress that the
income tax should be used as a flexible fiscal tool. This is not entirely a paradox;
something can be said for the view that fiscal ends are best accomplished by chang-
ing the rate structure rather than the tax base. In the end, however, this effort to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate fiscal uses of the tax system is
likely to founder. Indeed, the 1962 depreciation guidelines and investment credit
have been hailed as triumphs of a discretionary fiscal policy, though neither
changed the rate structure. See Statement of Gardner Ackley, Chairman, Council of
Economic Advisers, in Hearings on Fiscal Policy Issues of the Coming Decade Before
the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong.,
ist Sess., at 3 (i965).
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mit rates to be reduced, and with lower rates the benefit to be
reaped by the restoration of any one "preference" will be less-
ened; this will let some of the steam out of efforts to renew the
process of "eroding" the base. Alternatively, Congress could tax
the augmented base at rates that will produce additional revenue,
using the surplus to finance directly the programs that are now
covertly financed by tax concessions. In either event, Congress
will be willing and able (it is argued) to resist attempts to "erode"
the new tax base since it will be armed with an argument - "one
exception inevitably breeds another" - that now lacks persua-
sive force because today's Code is already riddled with "prefer-
ences" and "exceptions." 3 The aim, in short, is a reformed In-
ternal Revenue Code with a "correct" tax base, to which all men
of good will can and will rally when it is threatened by "excep-
tions," "special provisions," "preferences," "loopholes," and "leak-
ages."
In trying to come to grips with the CTB approach to income
taxation, I have encountered a distressing vagueness in the use
of terms like "preference." Sometimes we are offered a goal no
more precise than "an income-tax system which refuses special
benefits to some taxpayers because their income comes from par-
ticular sources, and which taxes alike all dollars of income." ' Of
the more elaborate conceptual frameworks, the following are a
fair sampling:
"[S]pecial Tax Provisions" . . . means any and all provisions
of tax law which are designed to afford significant preferential
treatment within each of the normal basic taxpayer categories.
Thus, this runs the whole gamut of taxpayer differentiation affected
by type of entity, size of income, time and nature of receipts and
' See Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform- Twenty Questions, 41 TAXES 672,
679 (1963):
There is nothing about the combination of rate reduction and base broadening
which dictates that all preferential provisions be eliminated, but there are
potent reasons for leaning over backwards before allowing any of them to
remain .... [The] existence of any one special dispensation makes it easier
to argue on behalf of others .... [T]he fewer gaps left in the base, the more
rates can be cut without affecting revenue yields.... [A] Spartan attitude
toward defending the integrity of the base will aid in creating the impression
that the reform plan is intended to improve the system as a whole, with the
chips falling as they may, and is not calculated to benefit certain identifiable
groups possessing political strength.
4 Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, in JOINT COMM=IEE ON
THE ECONOMIC REPoRT, 84TH CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL TAx POICY FOR EcoNoMIc
GROWTH AND STABILITY 297, 310 (Comm. Print x956) thereinafter cited as 1955
CoMPENDrum]; see note xo infra.
x967]
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expenses, geographical location, age, state of health, and family
status.5
While theorists may argue about what constitutes preferential
treatment, sophisticated taxpayers have not experienced a similar
difficulty. Instead they have been guided by this single principle:
It is more advantageous to accumulate wealth or enjoy personal
consumption in ways calling for the payment of less total income
tax than if the savings and consumption were financed only by
money received in the form of ordinary income and if that money
were spent on consumption or saved only in ways which did not give
rise to deductions for tax purposes. There is no reason why we
should depart from this realistic principle. Legislation is prefer-
ential to the extent it allows any taxpayer to accumulate wealth or
enjoy personal consumption without paying the full tax. And the
full tax is that which would be due if all of the taxpayer's eco-
nomic enhancement were financed by cash received as ordinary
income and if he did not qualify for any non-business deductions
or extraordinary exemptions or credits in the course of saving or
spending his income.
The wholly nonpreferred taxpayer thus is the man who receives
everything in fully taxable forms, who satisfies his personal con-
sumption and accomplishes his savings in nondeductible ways, and
who does not otherwise qualify for special exemptions or credits.
To the extent that any taxpayer fares better than this yardstick he
is being preferred. 6
Reference to a tax provision as "preferential" or "special" does
not connote opposition to the social or economic objective which
Congress has used the tax law to support. It does mean the pro-
vision deviates from a norm. Implicit in the reference is the idea
that the income tax has an essential integrity; that there is a funda-
mental standard for determining the tax base and the applicable
rates; that maintenance of the standard (restoration where it has
been eroded) is important to society, high on its scale of values;
that the proponent of a measure which deviates-which creates
a preference- has a burden of proof which goes as much to the
use of the tax system as the means of accomplishment as to the
measure's specific social or economic objective.7
' Atkeson, The Economic Cost of Administering Special Tax Provisions, in 195
COMPENDIUM 276, 279.
6 Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer
Morale, in id. at 251-52.
'Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 1i4 U. PA. L. Rnv.
17.1, x73 (1965).
[Vol. 80:925
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To determine the extent of erosion, we must first have some
notion as to what the tax system ought to be. Since this is to a
large extent a matter of equity, and since equity judgments are
highly personal, no single standard will meet everybody's approval.
Economists have defined the term "income" as consumption plus
(or minus) the net increase (or decrease) in value of an indi-
vidual's assets during the taxable period. I propose to use this
definition with two modifications: First, capital gains will be in-
cluded in income when realized or when transferred to others
through gifts or bequests; second, gifts and inheritances are to be
excluded from income. The first of these modifications is made
because it is probably impractical to include capital gains in income
until they are realized or transferred. The second accepts the
present status of estate and gift taxation as separate from income
taxation. As a working approximation, this concept of income is
equivalent to gross receipts in cash and in kind (other than gifts
and inheritances) received by the taxpayer during the taxable period
less the expenses necessary for the production of such receipts,
plus the net rental value of owner-occupied homes and net capital
gains transferred at gift or death.8
Most provisions leading to erosion [of the corporate income tax
base] . . . represent favorable treatment granted with the inten-
tion of promoting objectives deemed to be more important than
revenue and equity considerations. The dominant consideration
may be to provide an incentive to some highly desirable activity
such as defense-plant expansion, to relieve a depressed area or in-
dustry such as coal, to help small business, or to remove existing
discrimination by extending special tax treatment to comparable
industries or types of income. ...
Two standards are used in this paper to identify preferential
provisions. First, taxes should be neutral between different types
of economic activity. Tax neutrality is used here in the sense that
taxes be levied without discrimination and without favor between
different forms of income, between different categories of expendi-
ture, and between different industries. . ..
Secondly, taxable income in most cases should correspond to
commonly accepted business measures of net income consistently
followed.9
8 Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?, in x
1959 CO2M5aNT DIUM 25X, 259.
SHeilmuth, The Corporate Income Tax Base, in id. at 283, 284, 285, 286.
1967]
HeinOnline -- 80 Harv. L. Rev.  929 1966-1967
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Some briefer statements are quoted below."°
When writers turn to the task of listing the sources of "erosion,"
the bill of particulars almost always begins with such exclusions
as state and municipal bond interest, sick pay, foreign source in-
come earned by citizens abroad, and social security payments.
As the extracts set out above suggest, however, their authors are
not exclusively concerned with items that are totally excluded
from the tax base. Thus, the concept of "erosion" embraces de-
ductions (percentage depletion), differential tax rates (the long-
term capital gain rate)," rules relating to timing (postponement
by qualified pension plans), and other provisions, regardless of
the technical form in which they appear in the Code.
So far as I know, however, no one has attempted to list all the
sources of "erosion" to be found in existing law,'2 although the
10 Brazer, in z959 Panel Discussion 2o1: "ElIncome is essentially equal to the
value of rights exercised in consumption expenditure plus the change in one's
capital position over the course of the year. Now, you have a loophole under this
definition if you allow a deduction or an exclusion that is not justified under the
terms of this definition." Sneed, in id. at 12: "EEach dollar of income to a tax-
payer should be fully included in the tax base, irrespective of its source, except where
administrative convenience requires otherwise. The Simons definition of income
should be used as the ideal." For other statements see Surrey, The Congress and
the Tax Lobbyist -How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. Rxv.
1145, E146-48 (I957); Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the In-
come Tax Base, in 1 1959 CO'PENDIU 77, 84; see Ture, The Costs of Income Tax
Mitigation, 49 NAT'L TAx ASS'N PROCEEDINGS 51, 52 (1956); note 86 infra.
" The relationship of the CTB movement to differential rates is puzzling. Al-
though the tax base might initially be regarded as independent of the rate struc-
ture, excluding an item is in effect interchangeable with putting a zero rate on it;
and the capital gain provisions disclose a similar link between deductions and special
rates. Percentage depletion can also be regarded as a device to moderate the tax
rate applicable to a specified type of income. The advocates of a CTB regularly
describe the capital gain provisions as a source of "erosion" that must be closed to
achieve a CTB, and they sometimes apply the same label to the special rates ap-
plicable to joint returns. However, Pechman, supra note 8, at 276, calculates the
yield of a comprehensive income tax both with and without income-splitting, assert-
ing that this rate issue involves a value judgment that "cannot be resolved on a
priori grounds." This may imply that some (but not all) special rates are inconsist-
ent, on definitional grounds, with a CTB, for instance those that differentiate on the
basis of the source of income, such as the capital gain provisions and the rate re-
duction applicable to Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations.
12 The most extensive examination seems to be R. GOODE, THE INDnIrIuAL IN-
comE TAx 99-152 (1964). In my opinion, as will be seen, Goode's list is not ex-
haustive. In Pechman's estimates, the references to "all" eroding features were
probably intended to refer only to those "leakages" that he was able to quantify.
Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, io NAT'L TAx J. 1, 2 (1957); What Would a
Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?, in 1 1959 CoMPENDIUM 251; see p.
929 supra for his definitions. Surrey has compiled a list of "principal income exclu-
sions and preferences," but some of its inclusions are as surprising as some of its
omissions, and I do not know how vigorously he would defend it. Thus, the ex-
EVol. 80:925
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philosophy of "treating all income alike" in order to achieve a
CTB, with no seeds from which new "exceptions" can grow, is
premised on our ability to identify the provisions to be eliminated.
For this task we need more than a compilation of everyone's
favorite complaints.13
From the rhetoric of the broad base approach to tax reform, 4
one might get the impression that its advocates (or at least the
lawyers among them) would compute the taxpayer's gross in-
come by using section 61(a) as a starting point, discarding as
clusion of the income of state and local governments is cited, but not the exclusion
accorded to the income of tax-exempt institutions. Surrey, The Federal Income Tax
Base for Individuals, in i 1959 COMPENDIUM I, i5. Heller acknowledges that "a
consensus on a detailed definition may be difficult to achieve" and addresses himself
only to provisions or omissions "which have received considerable attention as in-
roads on the equity of the income tax." He does not disclose whose blackballs were
counted in this election, or how they were weighted; but I judge from his list that
the criterion was not one-man, one-vote. Heller, Limitations of the Federal Indi-
vidual Income Tax, 7 J. FINANCE [8g, 192-93 & n.14 (1952).
Efforts to compute "effective" income tax rates, as distinguished from nominal
rates, are necessarily premised on an "adjusted" taxable income figure, and thus
require the author to offer his alternative to the Code's version of "taxable income."
Here again, however, I know of no alternative definition that purports to eliminate
all "preferences." See, e.g., Musgrave, The Incidence of the Tax Structure and Its
Effects on Consumption, in 1955 COMPENDIUM 96. For macroeconomic analysis,
Musgrave's adjusted "broader income concept" may be adequate, but it would
hardly qualify as a no-preference base for taxing purposes. See also Musgrave,
How Progressive is the Income Tax?, in 3 1959 COMPENDIUM 2223; White & White,
Horizontal Inequality in the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and
Tenants, I8 NAT'L TAX J. 225 (1965). Attempts by welfare economists to measure
"income inequality" also require the scholar to devise an adjusted income base if
he thinks that taxable income is a misleading or inadequate concept. See STAIr
OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 88TI CONG., 2D SESS., Ti DISTRIBUTION OF
PERSONAL COuMnE io6 (Comm. Print x964); J. Mooa et al., INcom AN WEL-
FARE IN TEE UNITED STATES ch. 20 (x962); Lampman, The American Tax System
and Equalization of Income, 49 NAT'L TAX Ass'N PROCEEDINGS 271, 277-78 (x956).
13 See Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAxxs 672,
691 (1963): "So long as comprehensive reform is only a slogan, referring gen-
erally to rate reduction and base broadening, and not a concrete program for
action, an assessment of its chances is premature.... Until a specific program
has been developed, we cannot expect that the merits of the idea will get an
adequate airing."
14 In the absence of an authoritative membership list, I have treated all who
profess faith in a CTB as though they were full-fledged members of the dub, al-
though I recognize that they may not feel this way about each other. My concern
is not to measure degrees of loyalty to the CTB rhetoric, but to see what it means
and where it leads. The scholar whose professional work focuses on taxation may
brush the rhetoric aside as a crude label for a program, the details of which he
can consider on their individual merits. As the no-preference, comprehensive tax
base concept moves into the larger world, however, it is bound to lose some of the
qualifications that the experts tucked away in footnotes and appendices; and a
fortiori it will lack those that were never made explicit.
1967]
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a "preference" any provision which alters the result that would
be reached if section 6i (a) stood alone, whether it does so by
excluding an item from gross income, by assigning it to a different
year or to a different person, or otherwise. Having computed
gross income by looking solely to section 61 (a), we would then
convert it into taxable income by deducting the expenses, losses,
bad debts, and depreciation incurred in the taxpayer's business
or profit-motivated transactions- but nothing else. A rigorous
application of the "comprehensive base" approach, then, seems
to imply that sections 61(a), i62, i65, i66, 167, and 212 are the
only operative provisions needed for an ideal computation of
taxable income.
Another answer to the same question - how can we arrive at
a comprehensive base, devoid of all "preferences"? -that is
suggested or implied by the commentators, especially the econo-
mists, is use of the Haig-Simons definition of income as the touch-
stone. Haig defined personal income as "the money value of the
net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time,"
a formulation that was intended to include the taxpayer's con-
sumption, and that was thought by Simons to be interchangeable
with his own: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (i) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and end of the period in question." 'r
At times, the "broad base" commentators seem to imply that a
"true" or rigorous CTB would be achieved if Congress enacted
the Haig-Simons formulation. It is always admitted, to be sure,
that valuation difficulties or administrative problems require
some departures from the ideal (for example, with respect to un-
realized appreciation, imputed income from assets, and domestic
services by the taxpayer or his wife); but I take it that these
concessions assume that the departure is a preference, albeit an
unavoidable one. Such concessions, in other words, are adjust-
ments to practicality, rather than an integral part of the defini-
tion.16
1 1 TIE FEDERAL INcom TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921), reprinted, READINGS IN Tim
EcoN0ancs or TAXATITON 54 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959) (emphasis omit-
ted) ; H. SIMEONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAxATIoN 61-62, 206 (1938). When it came to
a program for action, Simons was more latitudinarian than his definition; indeed, he
said: "If one accepts our definition of income, one may be surprised that it has ever
been proposed seriously as a basis for taxation." Id. at io3.
18 If a concession to practicality is thought to be unavoidable, is it quibbling
to call it a "preference" rather than a definitional criterion? I think not, for two
reasons: (x) Whether practicality requires the concession is always a matter of
[Vol. 80:925
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Still another criterion that has been tendered as the starting
point in achieving a CTB, especially in the last few years, is
the concept of personal income as employed by the National In-
come Division of the Department of Commerce in its national
income statistics. Comparisons between the amount of taxable
income as reported on tax returns and personal income as com-
puted by the NID are sometimes efforts to estimate the amount
of illicit underreporting of items that may be more accurately
estimated by the NID than by taxpayers' admissions on tax re-
turns. I detect, however, an incipient tendency to move beyond
this use of the NID's conceptual framework, and to hold it up
(with some modifications, primarily the inclusion of capital gains
and losses and personal contributions for social insurance) as
a normative model."7
I do not suggest that the advocates of the "broad base" ap-
proach have explicitly asserted that the way to extirpate all "pref-
erences" and thus to "restore" the tax base is to repeal all sub-
stantive parts of existing law except section 6i (a) and the busi-
ness expense and loss provisions, or to enact the Haig-Simons or
National Income Division definition. These seem to me the di-
rections in which they point, however, and I have found in their
writings no other standards by which "preferences" can be in-
fallibly identified.
Against this background, I have set for myself the task of ex-
judgment; thus, to admit that the item is "income" within the Haig-Simons defini-
tion invites debate on the possibility of solving the practical problem-a debate
which a whole-hearted supporter of a CTB ought to enter with an eagerness to be
shown that inclusion is feasible. If the concession is buried in the definition, on
the other hand, this debate is foreclosed. (2) As I will suggest later, one who thinks
the item ought to be (but for practical reasons cannot be) included in income may
want to make other adjustments in the tax base to counterbalance this unavoidable
departure from principle.
17 For the use of NID statistics as a test of underreporting see Holland &
Kahn, Comparison of Personal and Taxable Income, in 1955 COMPENDIUM 313.
For their normative use (explicitly or implicitly) see, e.g., Surrey, supra note 12,
at 16-17; Cohen, Substantive Federal Tax Reform, U. So. CAL.. x964 TAx INsT.
711, 716; Galvin, supra note i, at 3-4; Resolutions on Substantive Tax Reform,
BuLL. ABA SEcTioN or TAxATIx, July x963 (Annual Report), at 4, 10 ("it may
be that as a matter of equity the spread [between NID personal income and IRC
taxable income) should be severely narrowed"); R. GOODE, THE INDIvmUAL
Lzcomm TAx 6 (x964) (supporters of income tax "are disturbed by special pro-
visions allowing much income to escape taxation, the ingenuity of taxpayers in
finding loopholes, the reluctance of Congress to repair the erosion of the tax base,
and incomplete compliance with the law. In 196o, for example, the amount of
income actually taxed equaled only about two-fifths of total personal income
x967]
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amining the major substantive areas of income tax law to see
what changes would be required if our overriding legislative aim
is to be a CTB without "preferences," "exceptions," or "special
provisions." In some of these areas, CTB commentators have
already specified a number of provisions that in their view con-
stitute "preferences," and I have sought by extrapolation from
these certified items to identify provisions that are equally
deserving of the same label. In other areas, I have had to strike
out largely on my own, since the possibility that "preferences"
exist in these areas seems to have gone unnoticed.
For reasons that will be set out in more detail hereafter, I have
concluded that a systematic and rigorous application of the "no
preference" or CTB approach would require many more sweep-
ing changes in the existing tax structure than have been acknowl-
edged. I also believe that many of these changes would be quite
unacceptable, despite their conformity to the Haig-Simons defini-
tion, to many of those who are attracted, in the abstract, by the
idea of a CTB. At the same time, there are in my view many
more ambiguities in the concept than have been acknowledged,
and at these points it sheds less light than some of its supporters
seem to claim. Some alleged "preferences," in other words, are
as compatible with the Haig-Simons definition as their elimination
would be. Finally, those who continue, in defiance of all experi-
ence, to hope for a simplified tax structure in a complex society
are doubly deluded, in my view, if they believe that a CTB will
make a significant contribution to simplification. Most of our
troublesome complexities concern issues that are either independ-
ent of the definitional criteria or unavoidable once we accept the
departures that even the most committed believers in a CTB
accept as desirable or necessary.
I. ExCLUSIONS FROM GRoss INCOME
Because tax differentials among taxpayers based on the source
of their income are inconsistent with the Haig-Simons emphasis
on consumption and net accretions to wealth as the proper meas-
ures of income, lists of "preferences" almost invariably begin with
items that are now excluded from gross income, such as interest
on tax-exempt bonds and social security payments. Indeed, al-
though the concept of "erosion" takes in such tax concessions as
deductions, credits, and differential rates, it has at its very core
the idea that many items properly belonging in the income tax
[VOL. 80:925
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base have been excluded from it by statutory or administrative
fiat. It is appropriate, therefore, to begin with the statutory and
other exclusions from gross income in analyzing the implications
of a CTB.
A. Social Security, Welfare, and Other Public Transfer Payments
An important theme in the literature of "erosion" is that social
security payments are earned by the taxpayer's personal services
and increase his wealth just as much as receipts from traditionally
taxable sources. Since these payments are not geared to the tax-
payer's financial needs, it is argued that their exclusion from
gross income is a poor way to protect a minimum subsistence level
and that direct public aid to the poor would insure that any given
amount of governmental assistance would reach those who de-
serve it, rather than being wasted on less needy claimants. In-
cluding social security payments in gross income (with an ad-
justment to permit the taxpayer to recover his contributions 18)
along with analogous benefits like railroad retirement and vet-
erans' pensions, therefore, has been a favorite way of "restoring"
the tax base.
Social security, railroad retirement, and veterans' benefits are
nominated for inclusion in the proposed CTB because they in-
crease the taxpayer's net worth in the Haig-Simons sense and be-
cause if excluded they will have a differential value depending
on his tax bracket and will not be openly reflected in the federal
budget-making process. These characteristics are shared, how-
ever, by many other federal, state, and local government benefits,
such as soil conservation and reforestation grants, subsidies to
attract industrial plants, scholarships and fellowships, aid to the
blind and other disabled persons, meals, clothing, and shelter
supplied to patients and inmates of hospitals, prisons, and other
public institutions, veterans' readjustment allowances, Medicare
protection, and unemployment compensation. Some advocates of
a CTB are prepared to tax these benefits (and those who eschew
this responsibility impair their credentials as consistent en-
emies of "preferences"); but it must be noted that this route soon
1
s The employee's contributions - his tax payments - amount on the average
to io-20o% of benefits, and a similar share comes from his employer's tax payments.
See Deran, Income Redistribution Under the Social Security System, 19 NAT'L
TAx 3. 276, 281 (1966). The balance is often described as a gift from the Gov-
ernment. As suggested below, however, if gifts from private persons are to be
excluded from the CTB, it is not clear why the exclusion of gifts from the public
would be a "preference."
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brings one face to face with the fact that every modern nation -
even if it does not call itself a welfare state or a Great Society -
provides its citizens with a variety of benefits through programs
that involve no transfer of cash or identifiable "property." 19 This
means that the "comprehensive tax base" must either measure the
benefit derived by the taxpayer from all governmental services,
or grant a "preference" to those who benefit from indirect gov-
ernment programs.
Thus, to tax the student who receives a federal or state scholar-
ship, while exempting the one who can attend a public institution
without charge, is a "preference" - as that term is used by the
advocates of a CTB - to the latter; and the same can be said of
an exemption for the businessman whose plant is made more acces-
sible and valuable by public improvements while his competitor
is taxed on a grant of land which was given him to induce a change
of location; of an exemption for the farmer who benefits from a
flood control project while his neighbor is taxed when a public
agency plants trees on his land to check erosion; and of rental
allowances vis-a-vis public or subsidized housing. Other trouble-
some areas are the services of welfare workers, county agricultural
agents, and the like; the net deficit of the postal service; and
government guarantees of loans to homeowners and businessmen.
Even if we look only to public programs providing benefits that
are susceptible to valuation and can be accepted or refused at
the recipient's option, a policy of rigorously taxing direct grants
would inevitably discriminate in favor of indirect benefits.
To be sure, a decision to tax all direct grants while exempting
indirect benefits in order to avoid a valuation quagmire 2 0 is not
" Federal subsidy programs aggregating $S.5 billion (excluding veterans'
benefits, public assistance, public health and school lunch grants, and aid to
Indians) for fiscal 1967 are listed in U.S. BuxRAu or THE CRNsVs, STATSTICAL
ABSTRACTr OF TH UNITED STATES 394 (1966), many of them providing indirect
rather than direct benefits to individuals and business firms. Cf. R. TITmuss,
ESSAYS ON "THE WELFARE STATE" 44 (1959), arguing that state intervention in
the economy in the interest of social policy did not commence in Britain with the
"welfare state" of 1948, but with the introduction of progressive taxation in x9o7.
0See MEAsURIN BENEFITS Or GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS (R. Dorfman ed.
1965), which assesses the difficulties of measuring the social benefits from some
public programs; to allocate these benefits, when measured, to individual taxpay-
ers would compound the difficulties, to put the matter mildly. For an attempted
allocation to various income classes see Gillespie, Effect of Public Expenditures on
the Distribution of Income, in EssAYs IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 122 (R. Musgrave ed.
1965) ; see also Conrad, Redistribution Through Government Budgets in the United
States, 595o, in INCoME REDISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL PoLICY 178 (A. Peacock ed.
1954); Adler, The Fiscal System, The Distribution of Income, and Public Welfare,
in FISCAL PoLICIes AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 359 (K. Poole ed. i95i).
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unreasonable; but it would require an admission that the aim of
"taxing all income alike" and extirpating all "preferences" had
been compromised. And once this is acknowledged, it is only
a short step to the conclusion that public policy is not necessarily
served by a single-minded effort to tax all grants that can be
measured, and that it might be better to decide, program by pro-
gram, which should be taxed and which should be exempt. To
take just three examples, the exclusions granted by existing law
to combat pay, unemployment compensation, and prizes for
notable public achievement may reflect an intuitive sense of fair-
ness or public pride. Assuming the irrationality of this feeling,
what is gained by including these items in a tax base that will
inevitably exclude a host of noncash benefits under public pro-
grams?
For a fully committed enemy of "preferences," governmental
benefits belong in the CTB even if the recipient must pass a means
test to qualify; thus, the exclusion allowed by existing law for
public assistance is a hidden subsidy to local welfare programs, and
it creates geographical disparities since it is worth more to the resi-
dents of a city that is generous in its welfare allowances or lenient
in disregarding outside earnings than to those whose city is more
strict in these respects. Pechman, for example, would include
such payments in the tax base, relying on the personal exemptions
(raised above the existing level, if necessary) and on increases
in the welfare payments themselves to prevent the income tax from
encroaching on the taxpayer's ability to feed, clothe, and house
himself.21 Even if every welfare recipient received a federal sub-
vention precisely equal to the tax burden resulting from including
his welfare payments in his gross income, I presume that this
reform would be viewed as an improvement over existing law by
a thoroughgoing enemy of "preferences" because it would bring
the federal grant into the open and compel it to pass through the
budgetary process. Some advocates of the CTB may falter at
this point,22 opening themselves to the charge of being "soft on
preferences"; but even they, presumably, would favor including
welfare payments in gross income if, as with social security pay-
ments, the recipient is not subjected to a means test. If so, they
21 Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, io NAT'L TAX J. 1, 12-14
(1957).
22 L. Shere, Federal Tax Revision To Promote Economic Growth and Stability
xo (mimeo 1956), reprinted, Hearings on r957 Economic Report of the President
Before the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Cong., ist Sess. 424 (i957), offers a
list of objectionable exclusions that is identical with Pechman's, save for public
assistance.
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may reach the same practical result as Pechman (despite their
rejection of his logical rigor) as the means test comes increasingly
to be rejected as degrading and self-defeating in the administration
of welfare programs.
In the foregoing discussion, I have accepted arguendo the theory
that public assistance, veterans' benefits, scholarships and free
tuition at public educational institutions, and the like are "sub-
sidies" in their entirety and that social security payments are "sub-
sidies" to the extent that they exceed the recipient's OASI pay-
ments. This premise is not unassailable, however; its validity
depends upon the kind of cost accounting one chooses to use. If
we take account of all taxes paid by the recipients of these public
programs over their lifetime, it may be that they pay in full for
what they get. Another possibility is that the price they pay can-
not be estimated with reasonable accuracy; and that the case for
excluding the benefits from income in order to make sure that the
recipients are not taxed on a return of their contributions is as good
as the case for treating the benefits as "subsidies." The CTB is to
take no account of police, fire, and military protection, I assume,
because there is no feasible way of comparing the taxpayer's
benefits with his payments.2" In the case of public assistance and
social security, the cash receipts can be measured, but it takes an
act of faith to come to a firm conclusion about the amount paid
by the recipient for these benefits. Perhaps the exclusion of these
items does not "erode" the base after all.
B. Charity and Other Private Transfer Payments
Government agencies were not the first to distribute welfare
benefits, nor have they yet preempted the field. If grants from the
public treasury to needy persons are to be included in gross
income, is there any justification for permitting gifts by charitable
institutions (which, in any case, are increasingly viewed as having
a quasi-public status) to be excluded? If veterans are to be taxed
on their G.I. benefits, can an exclusion be justified for scholarships
2 Perhaps the rationale is that the "recipient" of police, fire, and military
protection is society, not its individual members. In the case of public elementary
and secondary school education, it might again be argued that the "recipients" of
the expenditures are not the school children or their parents but society as a
whole. (But Gillespie, supra note 20, at 146, allocates expenditures for education
to school children.) Perhaps the same can be said of free college and university
education. If so, what is the predicate for the conclusion that welfare, unemploy-
ment compensation, and social security programs provide individual, rather than
social, benefits?
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and fellowships awarded by Harvard or the Ford Foundation?
If welfare checks are to be included in income, why not the
amounts received by the New York Times's Hundred Neediest
Cases or the beggar on the streets? I presume that the CTB is to
include charitable grants of all types in gross income, but I do not
recall any explicit discussion of the issue; and I suspect that some
who are attracted by the CTB concept will not be happy if it taxes
private charity along with public transfer payments.
Workmen's compensation, military disability benefits, and sick
pay, which are included in Pechman's list of unwarranted wel-
fare-oriented exclusions, substitute for or supplement the tax-
payer's wages when his earning capacity has been impaired by
illness or accident; but these are not the only sources of such as-
sistance. Existing law also excludes amounts received as damages
for personal injuries in automobile and industrial accidents, pay-
ments under accident and health policies, and similar receipts.
The ABA Committee on Substantive Tax Reform (in conjunc-
tion with its study of proposals to "broaden the tax base" by "in-
cluding in gross income items not now included") recently asked
the Treasury to estimate the revenue effect of including items of
this type in gross income "to the extent that such amounts are in
the nature of replacement of income rather than recovery of
capital, with provision, however, for tax free recovery of cost of
such items." 24 The terms of this inquiry imply that such receipts
might continue to enjoy an exemption if they compensate the tax-
payer for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of limb or
bodily function but not if they compensate him for loss of earnings
or, perhaps, for a diminution in his earning capacity.
Aside from difficulties in administering this distinction,
especially as respects lump-sum settlements of tort claims, it
cannot be easily reconciled with a "no-preference" tax base. If
the deduction for extraordinary medical expenses in existing law
is a "preference," why is not the proposed tax-free recovery of
medical expenses from a tortfeasor also a "preference"? In the
same vein, if existing law is "eroded" by the extra 6oo dollar
exemption for the blind (and if, as argued, it would be preferable
to bring assistance to the blind out into the open by direct govern-
ment subsidies to those who need financial aid), is it not equally
a "preference" to exempt the damages received by a blind tax-
payer from the tortfeasor who caused his misfortune? If the pain
24 Report of the Section of Taxation on Substantive Tax Reform, go ABA
REP. 289, 292-93 (ig6g).
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of daily labor and the exhaustion of the taxpayer's body during
his occupational career are not to be reflected in any tax con-
cession, is it not a "preference" to exempt the compensation he
may receive for pain and suffering or permanent injury caused by
an automobile or industrial accident? The ABA Committee's
request for a Treasury estimate does not mention the miscel-
laneous personal injury recoveries that are excluded by adminis-
trative practice or case law rather than by explicit statutory pro-
visions (for instance, damages for libel of personal reputation);
but a rigorous attack on "erosion" would, I presume, nullify these
exclusions as well.
Here again, I suggest that a CTB devoid of "preferences" has
ramifications that have seldom been explicitly acknowledged and
that will be repellent to many persons who are attracted by the
rhetoric of the broad base approach.
C. Personal and Dependency Exemptions
Although conditioned on the taxpayer's family status rather
than on the source of his income, the personal and dependency ex-
emptions "erode" the tax base on a grand scale. The 64 million in-
dividual income tax returns filed for 1963 claimed 183.5 million
exemptions, removing i xo billion dollars from taxable income and
thus reducing tax revenue by about 18.8 billion dollars." If the
purpose of the exemptions is to protect a minimum level of subsist-
ence against income taxation, the unvarying allowance of 6oo
dollars for the taxpayer, his spouse, and each dependent is ob-
jectionable because much of the benefit goes to persons who are
above the specified plateau. A "vanishing" exemption - di-
minishing rapidly for income above the subsistence level - or a
credit of a fixed amount would be free of this defect; 26 but even a
vanishing exemption or a credit would perpetuate another feature
of the personal exemption: it is "inefficient" by welfare standards
because it can be claimed by wealthy persons who are only
temporarily in low brackets, as well as by the children and other
dependents of high bracket taxpayers.2 7
SU.S. INrERNA REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTiCS o INCOmE- 1963: INDIVIDUAL
INcoMm TAx RETURNS 30 (1966).2 See generally M. LEVY, INcomE TAX ExE PTIONS (i96o); Note, A Proposed
Flexible Personal Exemption for the Federal Income Tax, iS STAN. L. REv. i162
(1966).
"
7 Perhaps an averaging system could be devised to prevent wealthy tax-
payers with fluctuating incomes from getting "unnecessary" exemptions, but this
would take some ingenuity. As to children and other dependents of high bracket
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Since the advocates of a CTB argue that a direct government
subsidy to the needy is preferable to the tax concessions of cur-
rent law for taxpayers who are blind or over sixty-five, receive
social security payments, or incur extraordinary medical expenses
or casualty losses, one would expect them to ask that the personal
and dependency exemptions also give way to federal public as-
sistance to qualified persons. This expectation is borne out by
their criticism of the extra exemptions allowed taxpayers who are
over sixty-five or blind; 28 but they appear to accept the personal
and dependency exemptions as an appropriate way of preserving a
minimum level of income from encroachment by the tax. Yet if we
convert the 183.5 million personal and dependency exemptions
claimed for 1963 into a hypothetical federal subsidy of 18.8 bil-
lion dollars, it can hardly be disputed that the circle of persons to
whom Congress would be prepared to allocate this subsidy would
overlap only in part the circle of taxpayers claiming the exemp-
tions.
For this reason, one might have expected the advocates of the
CTB to argue that it is inconsistent with their approach to exempt
entirely a family with three children having 3,699 dollars of in-
come, if indigent families of this size are getting only (say) 2,500
dollars of public assistance. Why not tax the first family, and let
Congress appropriate - as part of the open budgetary process -
such "subsidies" as are appropriate to aid all needy families (in-
cluding the 3,699 dollar family, if the imposition of an income
tax pushes it below the subsistence level)? The arguments that
taxpayers, exemptions could be denied to them if we taxed family units as ag-
gregates; but unless this (or the abolition of all personal exemptions) is a neces-
sary concomitant of a CTB, it seems to follow that the CTB is thought by its
supporters to be compatible with these "unnecessary" exemptions.
2
' E.g., Shere, supra note 22, at 9, Hearings, supra note 22, at 429:
Unfortunately the blind are only one of many disability groups that suffer
from handicaps in life. Chronological age is not a satisfactory measure of
fitness, and fitness is not an acceptable measure of taxable capacity under the
income tax. .. The benefits under ... [the social security] system can be
better adjusted to meet some rational standard than can the hidden benefits
under the graduated income tax which are progressively scaled to income.
The public would be in a better position to evaluate the sum total of benefits
that are desirable for older and disabled persons if they were kept together
in one place under the social security system ....
Pechman, supra note 21, at ig, adduces a different objection to these exemptions:
"The aged and the blind would have a valid claim for an additional exemption if it
could be shown that they are required to spend more out of a given income than
other taxpayers. There are no data on the expenditures of the blind, but the avail-
able evidence indicates that a family headed by an individual over 65 years of
age does not on the average spend more than other families in. the same income
group."
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are adduced against the exclusion of public assistance from gross
income seem to me equally applicable to the exemptions. Con-
versely, if the welfare function of the personal and dependency
exemptions is compatible with a comprehensive tax base even
though their benefits are "inefficiently" distributed, other welfare-
motivated tax allowances (like the exclusion of unemployment
compensation and social security benefits) can hardly be opposed
on the ground that the tax law is the wrong forum for advancing
social ends. Here again, I do not suggest that all preferences must
be preserved if any are preserved, but only that we will not make
much headway by unwarranted claims of logical rigor.
The exemptions are sometimes defended as devices for keeping
unproductive tax returns off the administrative rolls, rather than
for protecting a minimum subsistence level from taxation. This
aim might account for the taxpayer's own exemption, but it does
not explain those allowed for his wife and dependents; and it would
suggest a "vanishing" exemption or credit rather than a constant
amount that can be claimed even though the return is above the
nuisance level and must be filed and audited in any event. More-
over, with the advent of the withholding system, administrative
convenience became a less tenable ground for exemptions of any
kind. Many taxpayers whose taxable income is completely offset
by their exemptions must file returns to obtain refunds of with-
held taxes; and these unproductive returns are thus part of the
administrative load in any event. And now that we have auto-
matic data processing, it may be less costly and troublesome to
keep all potential taxpayers on the rolls at all times than to search
annually for nonfilers to make sure that they are not subject to
tax.
Another rationale for the exemptions is that they adjust the tax
burden to the taxpayer's familial responsibilities. (They do this
only at low levels of income, of course; for taxpayers in the
middle or upper reaches, the 6oo dollar exemption bears no sen-
sible relationship to the cost of maintaining a wife, child, or other
dependent.) But if the reduced rates applicable to taxpayers
filing joint, head-of-household, and surviving spouse returns are
objectionable because family expenses are costs of living that
should be defrayed from after-tax income - as contended by
some proponents of a CTB - the exemptions allowed for the tax-
payer's spouse and dependents would seem objectionable for the
same reason.
Finally, exemptions are the principal source of progressivity at
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low brackets and can be viewed as the equivalent of a zero rate of
tax on the bottom bracket. So viewed, are exemptions consistent
with a CTB? In one sense, yes; one might rationally argue for a
CTB coupled with a rate schedule that (for example) imposed a
zero rate on the first 25,ooo dollars of income and a fifty percent
rate on amounts above that level. But when a zero rate is imposed
on amounts that vary with the size of the family and that are
regularly discussed in terms of subsistence-protection (sometimes
by advocates of the CTB themselves, in proposing an increase in
exemptions to offset the burden resulting from taxing welfare and
other transfer payments 29), it seems to me that the "welfare"
function of the exemptions is paramount. If so, the "nonbudgeted
subsidy" argument of the CTB enthusiasts is not easily reconciled
with preservation of the personal exemptions.
D. Proceeds of Life Insurance
If the war on preferences compels us to include in gross income
the amounts received by a deceased wage-earner's family under
the federal social security system, I suppose it also requires us to
tax anything the family may receive from a tortfeasor for their
decedent's wrongful death: in both cases, the payments increase
the family's net worth and replace wages that would have been
taxed as earned. At this point, however, consistency requires the
advocates of a CTB to reconsider their apparent tolerance of sec-
tion ioi (a) (i), which excludes the proceeds of life insurance paid
on the death of the insured. This is no doubt an unpalatable sug-
gestion, but there is unfortunately no way to be comprehensive
except by being comprehensive.
Death benefits of 4 to 5 billion dollars are received annually by
the beneficiaries of life insurance policies, and almost all of this
amount "leaks" from the income tax base through the exclusion
of section ioi (a) (i), although it comes within the Haig-Simons
concept of income. To the extent of the policy's cash surrender
value (if any), this "preference" bears a resemblance to the ex-
clusion of gifts and bequests from gross income; but the theory
that the income tax exclusion merely compensates for a federal
9 See Pechman, supra note 8, at 267:
The exemptions in effect provide a zero rate for that part of an individual's
income which is below the minimum levels. Apart from the obvious humani-
tarian reasons, this zero rate is supported on the ground that taxation below
the minimum levels will reduce the health and efficiency of the lowest income
strata of the community and will eventually result in lower economic vitality,
less production, and possibly higher Government expenditures for social wel-
fare purposes.
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gift or estate tax burden is flimsy. Decedents' estates filing taxable
federal estate tax returns in 1963 included only about eighteen per-
cent of the life insurance death benefits paid in 1962,' o and the
gift tax is even less of an obstacle to the tax-free transfer of life
insurance. Moreover, some insurance proceeds are received in
a business setting - for example, "key man" insurance - where
the analogy to a bequest is not persuasive.
The inclusion of life insurance savings (imputed interest on the
terminal reserve or increases in the cash surrender value) in gross
income would be a palliative but not a corrective, since it would
not affect pure term insurance, payments under double indemnity
and other accidental death clauses, or mortality "gains" resulting
from early death.31 These payments (for instance, death benefits
of 5o,ooo dollars under flight insurance purchased for a few dol-
lars at an airport) are similar to gambling profits: without making
the nation richer, they transfer wealth from long-lived insureds to
the beneficiaries of short-lived insureds.
Let me make clear that I am not advocating the inclusion of
life insurance proceeds in taxable income. I am simply recording
my conviction that the exclusion of these receipts is a "preference"
as that term is used by the advocates of a CTB, that it may pro-
mote the purchase of life insurance just as percentage depletion en-
courages the discovery and draining of oil wells, and that it invites
the exclusion of other items that are functional substitutes for
insurance. If I am wrong in thinking that the war on preferences
requires repeal of section ioi (a) (i), however, why do its com-
"°Life insurance included in 1963 taxable returns totaled $680 million; death
benefits paid in 1961 and 1962, the years of death for estate tax returns filed in
1963, were $3,581 and $3,878 million respectively. U.S. INTERNAL REvENuE SERV-
ICE, STATIsTiCs Or I/co2mE - 1962: FmuciARY, GIFT, AND EsTATE TAX RETuRNs 51
(i965); INSTITUTE or LI=E 1NSURANCE, LiEm INsURANCE: FACT BOOK 1966, at 37.
Part of the amount included as "life insurance" in tax returns no doubt represents
values other than death benefits (policy dividends, cash surrender values of in-
surance on persons other than the decedent, and so on) ; if these were taken into
account, the proportion of death benefits included in taxable estates to aggregate
benefits paid would be even smaller than i8.
3' A good deal of attention has been devoted to the "interest" component of
life insurance, of course, but the beneficiary's tax-free receipt of the proceeds has
elicited less criticism. See, e.g., Irenas, Life Insurance Interest Income Under the
Federal Income Tax, 21 TAx L. REV. 297, 314-18 (1966); Goode, Policyholders' In-
terest Income from Life Insurance Under the Income Tax, 16 VAlD. L. REV. 33
(1962). Vickrey argues that it would be "theoretically correct" to require the
beneficiary to report "that part of the benefit which consists of insurance proper,
but not that part which is paid from the reserve," the latter being excluded,
evidently, as a gift from the policyholder. W. VIrxREY, AGENDA FOR PROoGUSSrVE
TAxATo 66 (1947).
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manding generals have so much enthusiasm for repealing section
ioi (b) (the 5,o0o dollar employee death benefit) and for taxing
death benefits paid under the social security system?
E. Gifts and Bequests
Both Haig and Simons, who might be regarded as the spiritual
forefathers of the CTB, believed that gifts and bequests consti-
tuted "income" as they defined the term. The theory that these
items should be excluded from gross income because we have
separate transfer taxes on gifts and bequests -which take no
account of the recipient's other income - was characterized by
Simons as "one of the most spurious and naive types of argument
in the literature." 12 To his rebuttal at the theoretical level one
might add that only about one-eighth of inherited property finds
its way into the taxable estates of decedents subject to the federal
estate tax. Most amounts received by bequest, in other words,
bear no federal estate tax burden; and for those that do, the death
tax burden is often less than the income tax that would be imposed
on the recipient if this "leakage" were eliminated. As to gifts, the
existence of a federal gift tax is an even weaker reason for ex-
cluding them from a CTB. The statistics on inter vivos transfers
are fragmentary, but experience tells us that the donor who pays
a gift tax is a rara avis.
Although advocates of a CTB sometimes call attention to this
issue, the dominant mood is acquiescence in existing law. I do not
know whether they have steered clear of section 102 (excluding
gifts and bequests from gross income) because they think it is a
"good" preference or out of political realism. Bunching of income
would be a problem, of course, if section 102 were repealed; but
the advocates of a CTB almost always favor income averaging
rather than an exclusion as the appropriate remedy for this
22 Simons, supra note i5, at 126-127.
In the absence of a more authoritative estimate, I offer the following com-
putation. R. LAam'AN, THE S]LA.R or Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH
1922-56, at 23 (1962), estimates that about 3o% of "personal sector wealth" was
held in 1953 by "top wealth-holders" (persons with gross estates of $6o,ooo or more).
Let us assume that the wealth owned by top wealth-holders who died in 1953 was
30% of the wealth owned by all 1953 decedents. Federal estate tax returns filed
in 1954 reported net estates of $7 billion ($74 gross, less debts of $04). U.S.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOmE - 1962: FiDUCIARY, GIFT, AND
ESTATE TAX RE TRxS Si (1965). If these returns reflected 30% of the wealth owned
by all 1953 decedents, the aggregate wealth transferred by death in 1953 was $23.3
billion (100o times $7 billion). Taxable estates aggregated $3 billion, or 13% of
the aggregate amount transferred by death.
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phenomenon, and sometimes they promise rates so low that timing
will be unimportant. There are other reasons for excluding gifts
and bequests from the income tax base, such as the distortions in
family transfer patterns that would result from efforts to bypass
as many generations or intermediate donees as possible, and the
difficulties in taxing the beneficiaries of discretionary trusts.
These, however, are no more self-evident or compelling -to me,
at any rate - than the reasons that led Congress to enact many
of the other "preferences" of existing law. Nor can gifts and be-
quests be excluded from gross income without inviting the ex-
clusion of many other items that share some of their characteristics
- scholarships and fellowships, prizes, some employee death
benefits, life insurance proceeds, public assistance, social security
payments, unemployment compensation, and so on.
F. Support, Dower, and Similar Rights
If a gold digger strikes it rich, would a CTB require the present
value of her right to be supported by her wealthy husband to be
included in her taxable income in the year of marriage, along
with the estimated value of her dower rights? If this mode of im-
proving one's economic status is to be granted a "preference" by
being excluded from gross income because of valuation difficulties,
should the amount actually spent by the husband on his wife's
support be reported by her annually during the continuation of
the marriage? As to wives, this refinement would be of little
significance if the husband were allowed to deduct the amounts
included in the wife's tax base (as with periodic alimony under
existing law) and if the joint return of existing law were preserved
in the reformed tax structure; but if support payments "belong"
in a CTB, they ought to be accounted for by children as well as by
the wife. Absent a "family" return aggregating the income of
parents and children, however, the tax structure would be much
altered by including support in the taxable base of children and
other dependents. And even as to the wife, the advocates of a
CTB ordinarily assert that family responsibilities are merely a
form of personal consumption that are not legitimately reflected
in a tax base - an approach implying that the husband should
not be permitted to deduct the expense of maintaining his wife
even if she is required to account for the support in her income.
A committee of the ABA Tax Section recently recommended
that the Internal Revenue Code be amended to provide explicitly
that the wife does not realize taxable income "from the acquisition
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of support rights or dower rights either on marriage, or annually
thereafter." 31 Although this proposal merely codifies the ad-
ministrative practice of the day, it implies that section 61 (a) of
existing law is broad enough, at least in theory, to require these
items to be included in taxable income. Is the ABA proposal one
of those "special exceptions" that would "erode" the tax law, to be
resisted at all cost lest it serve as a precedent for more "prefer-
ences"? I put the question not entirely in a spirit of Schaden-
freude, because genuine problems do arise if support is excluded
from a CTB. Support is a next door neighbor of gifts and be-
quests; if wives and children are not taxed on the support they
receive from the head of the family but are required to include
gifts and bequests from him in their taxable income, some mighty
fine distinctions will have to be drawn. This painful task may be
avoided by excluding gifts and bequests, support payments, and
life insurance death benefits from the proposed CTB. But the
resulting disloyalty to the Haig-Simons definition will then be so
monumental that I am baffled by professions of faith in that touch-
stone when the issue is the proper treatment of other types of
transfer payments by individuals, private institutions, and public
agencies.
G. Imputed Income from Taxpayer's Assets
The exclusion from gross income, as presently defined, of the
net rental value of owner-occupied residences has been a common
target of commentators, and some have also criticized the failure
to tax imputed income from other assets, for example, the net
rental value of household furnishings and the value of bank serv-
ices provided in lieu of interest on idle balances in checking ac-
countsY5 Acknowledging that it would not be easy to value these
3 4 BULL. ABA SECTION or TAxAarox, July 1965 (Annual Report), at 59. Thus
far, the ABA Tax Section has not turned its attention to another danger that
looms on the horizon if the tax base is broadened to take all economic enhance-
ment into account. I mean the possibility that a wealthy bachelor may realize in-
come on marriage equal to the present value of the tax savings resulting from
filing joint returns until his death or divorce. For a calculation of this increase in
his net worth see Hellborn, Uncle Sam's Dowry, 44 NAT'L TAX Ass'N PROCEEDINGS
310 (195).
" It has been reported that a private bank proposes to provide its depositors
with "a highly trained staff that will translate letters and documents, carry out
personal secretarial assignments, get theater tickets and travel reservations and ad-
vise on investments," in the manner of "an exclusive private club where privileges
and services will be extended only to properly sponsored and approved members."
The bank would require minimum balances of $25,000 in personal checking ac-
counts and $5o,ooo in business accounts. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1965, at 29, col. z.
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economic advantages or to enforce compliance, most advocates of
a CTB would evidently be satisfied with taxing the imputed rent
of owner-occupied residences and willing to exempt imputed in-
come from other assets. I presume that they would agree, how-
ever, that this tolerance, even if impelled by the pain and suffering
that consistency would require, would "erode" the tax base.36 I
do not know the order of magnitude of the "special exception"
that is thus to be granted to the owners of personal property, but
it must be at least as substantial as many "preferences" that we are
asked to nullify.
H. Income from Vicarious Enjoyment
Under existing law, the income from property transferred by
gift is ordinarily taxable to the donee, not to the donor; but in
some circumstances (as with so-called grantor or Clifford trusts),
the income is imputed to the donor on the ground that he continues
to enjoy it, though vicariously. It is often suggested that the tax
base is "eroded" by excessive concessions to donors, and that the
income thrown off by transferred property, family partnerships,
and the like should be taxed to the donors whenever they vicari-
ously enjoy it, not merely in the limited circumstances defined by
existing law.37 As the expression of an attitude, this is all very
well; but it hardly constitutes a program for reform. Is it pro-
posed that a taxpayer who makes a gift of stock to his ten year-old
son be taxed on the dividends even if they are accumulated
in a bank account rather than spent currently? - even if the
parents are divorced and the mother rather than the taxpayer gets
custody of the child? - even after the child reaches his majority?
If the CTB requires inclusion in all these circumstances, what of
the income generated by stock (or the reinvested proceeds
thereof) that is donated by the taxpayer to adult children, friends,
and charitable institutions?
The Haig-Simons definition seems to seize upon legal rights
rather than vicarious enjoyment as the measure of income; but, as
is true whenever we encounter an issue that is worth arguing about,
it is sufficiently flexible, or ambiguous, to support either approach.
3 6 See note 16 supra.
37 Of course, the income generated by donated property, transfers in trust,
and family partnerships is taxed to someone; it does not drop out of the income
tax base entirely. Hence the claim that these income-splitting arrangements con-
flict with a CTB implies that the CTB concept dictates, or helps to determine, the
taxpayer by whom a given item of income should be reported. This is, at best, a
debatable theory. See pp. 974-77 infra.
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If the CTB is to look solely to the taxpayer's legal rights, it will
achieve consistency at the expense of realism, while if it accepts
vicarious enjoyment as a determinant of income, it will plunge us
into the same morass that the income-splitting practices of exist-
ing law create. Unless all donors are taxed on all income from
property transferred by gift, distinctions will have to be based -
just as under existing law - on the relationship between the donor
and donee, the character of the property, the mode of transfer,
and other factors thought to be relevant. No matter where these
lines are drawn, they will grant "preferences" to those on the non-
taxable side. Here again, there is no formula that will give us a
tax base devoid of "exceptions," "loopholes," and "leakages."
I. Miscellaneous Exclusions
If the aim is to eliminate all exclusions of existing law so that
all income is included in the CTB, what are we to do about such
tax-exempt persons and institutions as the British ambassador,
the Girl Scouts, the local Baptist church, the City of Boston,
the Port of New York Authority, the Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks, the Teamsters, the Yale Club of New York City,
and so on? There are occasional intimations that some of these
exemptions are "preferences," 3s but I know of no authoritative
list of those marked for extinction; and I suspect that even the
most hardy advocates of a CTB will find reasons for keeping the
list rather short. Still, as Blum says, one preference leads to
another; '9 there is surely no magic in the line drawn by existing
law between exempt and taxable institutions. Conversely, if we
can have a CTB even though churches, universities, labor unions,
and other socially useful institutions are tax-exempt, I do not
see why the CTB is not also consistent with the partial tax-ex-
emption, special deductions, or special rates that are available to
cooperative societies, mutual savings banks, insurance companies,
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, and other organiza-
tions. Once these provisions are accepted, in turn, it is but a small
" As pointed out in note 12 supra, Surrey's list of exclusions and preferences
includes § zis, exempting the income of state and local governments. Hellmuth,
supra note 9, at 312-13, says that "the possibility of including net income of Gov-
ernment-owned commercial enterprises, such as electric powerplants, could be
raised." I do not know whether the question to be raised is whether the existing
exclusion is a "preference," or whether the "preference" should be eliminated.
If the exemption of governmental revenue is threatened by a CTB, I suppose that
a fortiori § 5oi (c) is in jeopardy.
" See note 3 supra.
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step to many other "preferences" that we are asked to eliminate
in order to achieve a CTB. Thus, if Harvard's investment income
is to be exempt from income tax because its activities are socially
useful, is it persuasive to assert that a deduction must be denied
to contributors to Harvard in order to keep the income tax struc-
ture "neutral"? Conversely, if the exemption of state and munici-
pal bond interest is an illegitimate, because hidden, federal "sub-
sidy," what is the proper label for section 115, exempting all in-
come derived by a state or political subdivision from operating
a public utility or exercising an essential governmental function?
No doubt many if not most of our tax-exempt institutions operate
at a loss, but some do not. For these, an exempt status can be
predicated only on value judgments of the type that the CTB is
supposed to avoid.
II. PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS
Advocates of a CTB are ordinarily hostile in theory to the per-
sonal deductions of existing law, arguing that the taxpayer's dis-
posable income is the ideal tax base no matter how he may choose
to spend it. But they do not cleave consistently to this theory.
Thus, Pechman would preserve the deductibility of state income
taxes to encourage use of these taxes at the state level 40 and
to minimize interstate tax differentials, and he favors or would ac-
cept deductions for large charitable contributions, extraordinary
medical expenses, and major casualty losses. 1 Senator Long's
"optional simplified tax method" 42 is more hostile than Pechman's
proposal to personal deductions, rejecting all of the "preferences"
that Pechman favors or is willing to accept; but it makes its own
"exceptions" to the tax base: alimony, bad debts, and section
212(3) expenses. Galvin would preserve the same personal de-
ductions as Pechman (charitable contributions, medical expenses,
and casualties) and would add the interest deduction to this list
of acceptable "preferences," but only to the extent that these items
amount in the aggregate to more than twenty percent of the tax-
payer's adjusted gross income.4 3 Some other enemies of "prefer-
40 Cf. the suggestion that inclusion of interest from state and municipal bonds
in the federal income tax base might cause the states to rely more heavily on re-
gressive taxes, in Bronfenbrenner, Economic Effects of the Taxation of Government
Securities, 35 ILL. L. REV. 293, 305-07 (1940).
41 Pechman, supra note 8, at 273-74.
42S. 3250, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
a' Galvin, Tax Reform-What? Again?, 17 Sw. L.. 203, 219-20 (1963).
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ences" find virtually all of the personal deductions acceptable,
but want dollar or percentage floors to be established so only ex-
traordinary amounts will qualify; in some cases, they also favor
the imposition of ceilings to insure that extraordinary amounts
will not qualify if they are too extraordinary.
I think it is fair to say of these proposals that they cannot be
reconciled with the generalization ("no preferences") that we are
often urged to accept as the prime criterion of a sound tax struc-
ture. They can be reconciled with other criteria, however, which
might be verbalized as follows: The base to which the tax rates
are to be applied should take account of costly catastrophes in the
taxpayer's personal life and should offer him an incentive to make
charitable contributions. It should also (some would say) allow
him to deduct state income taxes in order to encourage, or refrain
from discouraging, the levy of this type of tax by the states. Some
other items such as interest and bad debts should be deductible to
avoid the abrasive administrative burden of separating those that
are business-oriented from those that serve only a personal pur-
pose. Finally, the difficulty of verifying claims for personal ex-
penditures and the fact that all taxpayers incur some items of
this type as part of the normal cost of living, justify the imposi-
tion of a nondeductible floor on these expenses.
The principles that govern - as distinguished from those that
are said to govern -the tax programs offered to us by their
authors strike me as (a) sensible, and (b) familiar. I describe
these principles as sensible because they involve an examination
of each deduction to see what can be said for and against it, and
as familiar because they do not depart in any significant sense from
the principles embodied in every revenue act since 1913. Many
of the proposed changes seem meritorious to me, but they stem
from relatively minor differences in judgment; and they do not
begin to resemble the dramatic leaning over backward against "ex-
ceptions" and "preferences" that is prescribed by Blum as the
only posture capable of protecting the tax system against further
"erosion." 44 In short, the proposals summarized above would in-
vite - precisely as existing law invites - the proliferation of
other personal deductions on the ground that they too deserve a
boost from the tax structure or result from unexpected or cata-
strophic events in the taxpayer's personal life; and they also would
invite the same process of refining, elaborating, and individualiz-
ing the concept of a "proper" deduction that has resulted in the
4 4 See note 3 supra.
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preposterous detail of the charitable contribution and medical
expense provisions of existing law. On balance, however, I would
prefer to amend or even to retain the personal deductions and face
the troubles they inevitably spawn rather than abolish them. Evi-
dently the enemies of "preferences" have come to the same
conclusion.
III. THE PERSONAL-BUSINESS BORDERLINE
Since the ideal of the advocates of a CTB is a tax on "net" in-
come, they retain the distinction between the cost of living, which
is not to be deductible, and the cost of earning a living. They
cannot be blamed for the haziness of this distinction, of course,
but they have blithely bestowed the pejorative terms "prefer-
ence," "erosion," and "special exceptions" in the erroneous be-
lief that the CTB concept is a useful tool of analysis in this area.
In point of fact, however, it is of no assistance in separating per-
sonal from business expenditures, or in deciding whether or how
to allocate the cost of items that inextricably confer personal bene-
fits on the taxpayer at the same time that they serve his business
purposes.
Thus: should taxpayers be allowed to deduct the expense of
driving to and from work, of clothing or grooming themselves in
the manner required by or suited to their jobs, of liberal or pro-
fessional education,45 of moving to new business locations, of
curing or insuring against occupational diseases or job-related in-
juries, of entertaining customers and other business associates, or
of maintaining themselves on business trips? The deduction of
travel and entertainment expenses is so frequently denounced as
a "preference" as to imply that the proposed CTB is not to make
allowances for any borderline expenditures; but perhaps this
hostility to "T & E" is an ad hoc or moral judgment that does not
apply to moving expenses, work clothes, or accident insurance.
Similarly, the ability of business executives and self-employed
professionals to squeeze a variety of personal benefits out of their
deductible expenditures - the lawyer who can use his secretary
on personal errands; the physician who reads the National Geo-
graphic before putting it in his waiting room; the executive whose
family occupies empty seats on a company plane - is often cited
as a source of "erosion" in the tax base; but here again we are
"See Goode, Tax Treatment of Individua Expenditures for Education and
Research, 56 Am. EcoN. REv. 208 (x966).
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assailed by labels rather than offered an analysis.46 Like it or
not, our lives are not so compartmentalized that these borderline
items can be readily classified.
The child care deduction of existing law, section 214, is a good
example of this troubled area, and it nicely illustrates the irrel-
evance of the CTB concept to the problem of borderline expendi-
tures. If the mother of small children takes a job outside the
home, she may have to hire a nurse or baby-sitter; thus, section
2 14 is a plausible way to reflect the fact that the working mother's
salary is not all gravy. But if section 214 is not a "preference"
and does not "erode" the tax base, would it deserve these pejora-
tives if it were amended (a) to eliminate the family income limit
of section 2 14 (b) (2) (B), thus permitting upper bracket families
to qualify; (b) to permit all two-job families to deduct the increase
in their living expenses resulting from the housewife's absence from
the home (such as the extra cost of cleaning the house and of pre-
paring meals or eating in restaurants); or (c) to permit bachelors
to deduct the extra cost of living alone? Finally, what is the differ-
ence - so far as the concept of a CTB is concerned - between
allowing the working mother to deduct her child care expenses
and allowing the business executive to deduct the extra cost of cus-
tom-tailored clothing? If the answer is that the business man
works in order to be able to live well, rather than the reverse, it
is also true that some mothers do not hire a nursemaid in order to
work, but work in order to hire a nursemaid.
A ground for eliminating provisions like section 214, and re-
sisting the enactment of others, is that the business necessity of
borderline expenditures is hard to prove or disprove, while their
personal component is usually clear, with the result that deduc-
tions in this area cannot be adequately policed and will therefore
breed exaggeration, fraud, and public discontent.47  This is a
plausible reason for restricting such deductions, but it is different
from one-dimensional insistence on a CTB. Moreover, it leaves
" I have heard no clarion call for denying the academic community the right
to deduct living expenses incurred while teaching away from home for the summer
or traveling on sabbatical leave, or for taking into income such fringe benefits as
free tuition for faculty children and personal use of university facilities; but per-
haps these "preferences" are "desirable as means of carrying out supervening eco-
nomic and social policy" rather than tainted by "mere submission to private interest
groups and political expediency" (to use Heller's dichotomy, supra note 12, at
193).
" On the possibility of allocating such expenses see Klein, The Deductibility
of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-
A Conceptual Analysis, is Stam. L. RFv. o99 (1966).
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room for deciding that some borderline expenditures should qual-
ify for deduction because their business function can be either
established with reasonable certainty or properly assumed with-
out proof, or because the personal benefit they confer is usually
modest. In an analogous area - interest and bad debts - some
advocates of a CTB, acknowledging that it may be difficult to
say whether the taxpayer's payment or loss is personal or profit-
oriented, have favored an unlimited deduction rather than an at-
tempt to separate the business items from the personal ones or a
Draconic denial of any deductions for interest and bad debts. This
is a plausible approach (and it can with equal plausibility be ap-
plied to the business-personal expenditure area), but it is a judg-
ment that derives no support from, because it is irrelevant to, the
CTB concept.
IV. BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS
If there is such a thing as a "classic" preference, percentage
depletion heads so many lists that it surely qualifies for this ac-
colade. In allowing the taxpayer to deduct more than his financial
outlay in the interest of stimulating investment, however, per-
centage depletion has much in common with the investment credit.
The former is more selective, to be sure, because limited to the
mineral industries; but the investment credit is by no means
"neutral" either. It is intended to prefer investment over con-
sumption, and it distinguishes among competing investment op-
portunities: foreign investment, short-lived and nondepreciable
assets, and most buildings do not qualify, and public utilities are
treated less generously than other taxpayers.
I assume, therefore, that the investment credit has been less
frequently described as a source of "erosion" only because it was
unveiled too late to be included in most lists of "special provi-
sions," not because it is consistent with a "no preference" tax
system.48 This impression is strengthened by the fact that per-
centage depletion and the investment credit were evidently
bracketed by the ABA Committee on Substantive Tax Reform
when it requested Treasury estimates of the impact on revenue
of a variety of tax reforms, since one of its assumptions was that
business and investment outlays would be capitalized and "the
basis of such assets [would be recovered] over the useful life of
4 Some proponents of a CTB no doubt regard the credit as a "good" prefer-
ence because of the contribution it makes to economic growth.
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the assets in accordance with any one of several methods of capi-
tal recovery used by the business and investor community." "9
This statement eschews explicit mention of percentage depletion,
but it seems (and was understood) to be a roundabout way of ask-
ing the Treasury to assume that depletion deductions would be
restricted to the taxpayer's cost; and it also seems to exclude the
investment credit from the hypothetical tax structure whose rev-
enue results were to be estimated by the Treasury.
In contemplating the depreciation or amortization of business
assets by "any one of several methods of capital recovery used
by the business and investor community," moreover, the ABA
committee may also have been implying that a CTB is inconsist-
ent with the recent statutory trend toward speeding up the write-
off of a wide range of expenditures that under conventional ac-
counting principles would either be written off more slowly or be
held in abeyance and applied to reduce taxable income only on
a sale or abandonment of the asset. These statutory provisions,
some of them inspired by the allowance of accelerated amortiza-
tion for wartime productive facilities, include: section 169 (grain
storage facilities); section 173 (newspaper and magazine circu-
lation expenditures); section i74 (research and experimental
expenditures); sections 175, i8o, and 182 (expenditures by farm-
ers for soil and water conservation and for clearing and fertilizing
land); section i77 (trademark and trade name expenditures);
section 179 (additional first-year depreciation deduction for small
business); section 248 (corporate organizational expenditures);
and sections 263(c), 615, and 616 (expenditures for exploring,
drilling, and developing mineral properties). To these statutory
"preferences," we might add the administrative practice of al-
lowing the taxpayer to deduct the cost of small tools and institu-
tional advertising, when capitalizing these expenditures would be
more appropriate,50 as well as the 1962 depreciation guidelines,
to the extent that they permit the taxpayer to assign shorter use-
ful lives to his assets than an independent examination of his busi-
ness practice would warrant.51
49 Report, supra note 24, at 294.
"oFor 1964, it is estimated that $14 billion of "producers' durable equipment"
(primarily tools) was charged to current expense. U.S. DEP'T OF CommRcE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT Busnss, Aug. 1965, at X2.
5 1 Double declining balance depreciation was proposed as a practical substitute
for "correctly-computed realistic depreciation" by G. TERBORGn, REALiSTIc DE-
'REcrAToN Pouicy x49 (1954), but empirical evidence on loss of value through
time (which should be controlling to those who hold to the Haig-Simons defini-
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Such statutory and administrative provisions for the "expens-
ing" or rapid amortization of capital outlays are usually pro-
posed either as incentives to investment or as devices to avoid
difficulties in allocating the expenditures in question to specific
years; but voices are also sometimes raised in favor of allowing all
capital outlays to be deducted in computing taxable income when
incurred or over whatever period of time the businessman chooses
to designate. One such proposal is based on the claim that exist-
ing practices sanction the current write-off of virtually all expendi-
tures for intangible assets even though they have a protracted use-
ful life, so that it is pointless to blow the whistle on outlays for
tangible property. This suggestion might be regarded as a "no-
preference" approach to the write-off of capital investments. 2
It is also argued that technological developments in a dynamic
economy "make any capital expenditure of certain benefit only
for the present accounting period," so that expensing such outlays
(with the exception, perhaps, of real estate improvements) would
accurately reflect economic reality.53 Though it may appeal to
our vision of an America on the move, this theory cannot be rec-
onciled with the fact that the average attained age of business
equipment in use today is about ten years, a figure that has not
varied more than a year or two in either direction for any year
since 192o, and that is, of course, less than the anticipated useful
life of the equipment. Moreover, equipment with an average at-
tained life of five years or less accounted for about thirty-five per-
cent of all business equipment in 192o and for about the same
percentage in 1965. As for business plant, as distinguished from
equipment, its average attained age in our "dynamic" society is
about twenty-four years, while it was only about twenty years in
the period 192o-I93o." These macroeconomic estimates are
confirmed by experience: few taxpayers have attempted to prove
useful lives for their equipment shorter than those in the 1962
tion of income) is, by the author's own admission, totally inadequate. Id. at 39.
Rapid depreciation may also be viewed as a rudimentary method of compensating
for inflation; indeed, "expensing" of capital outlays would eliminate the complaint
that depreciation does not provide an adequate replacement fund in an inflation-
ary economy. The advocates of a comprehensive tax base, however, would pre-
sumably not find this a persuasive argument.
" Dean, Four Ways To Write Off Capital Expenditures - Can We Let Manage-
ment Choose?, in 1955 ComPENDIUM 504, 5og-iI; Dean, Capital Wastage Allow-
ances, in 2 1959 CoMPEDIUM 813.
53 Galvin, supra note 43, at 220. This argument implies that published financial
statements overstate income on a monumental scale.
"'See CAPITAL Goons Rav., Sept. 1964 (Machinery & Allied Prods. Inst.).
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"guidelines"; and the vigorous complaints that we hear about
the reserve ratio test stem from the fact that equipment is not
being replaced at the rate implied by the 1962 guidelines, let
alone at the rate that would be implied by a general expensing
policy.
When all is said and done, then, statutory provisions and admin-
istrative practices that permit capital outlays to be deducted when
incurred, or over periods shorter than their useful lives, are prop-
erly seen as "preferences" by the taxpayer who must depreciate his
productive facilities over their useful economic lives and who can-
not amortize any part of his investment in land, goodwill, and
similar assets because their economic life is not reasonably pre-
dictable. Since they take no account of the taxpayer's net worth,
such provisions are not easily reconciled with the Haig-Simons
definition.
Indeed, one who is seeking to eliminate all "preferences" can-
not avoid questioning the propriety - from the point of view of
"treating all income alike" -of the rapid methods of deprecia-
tion that entered the Code in 1954 or that were approved earlier
by administrative practice. The statutory methods are not per-
missible for used or short-lived assets; these limitations acknowl-
edge an intent to stimulate investment rather than to "clearly
reflect income," and this nonrevenue purpose would presumably
require their ouster from a purified tax system.55 Finally, one
might go so far as to ask whether straight-line depreciation, though
sanctioned by long usage, would be consistent with the CTB or
would accurately reflect "the taxpayer's economic enhancement" 11
unless limited to the annual decline in the market value of the
depreciable property. We are told, to be sure, that depreciation
"is a process of allocation, not valuation," 57 but if there is no de-
cline in value, what is there to allocate?
It is obvious that these implications of a systematic program
" The debate among accountants and security analysts over the proper way -
"flow-through" or "normalization" - to reflect the tax savings generated by the
investment credit, the x962 depreciation guidelines, and the 1g4 accelerated de-
predation methods springs from a candid acknowledgment that these write-offs
are less "realistic" than the depredation deducted for financial statement purposes.
p See . 928 & note 6 supra.
57 A. EiCA INSTIUTE OF CERT=D PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING TER-
MWOLOGY BULLETI No. 43, at 76 (I96i). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 3x9 U.S. 98, iox (1943): "The end and purpose of it all (depreciation ac-
counting] is to approximate and reflect the financial consequences to the taxpayer
of the subtle effects of time and use on the value of his capital assets" (emphasis
added).
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to "treat all income alike" would be highly unpalatable to many
who profess to be attracted by the principle of eliminating "pref-
erences" of every variety. In an effort to avoid these implications,
they are likely to urge that tax "incentives" to invest in productive
facilities will pay us dividends in increasing output, an improved
growth rate, and less unemployment - forgetting that whole-
hearted devotion to a CTB leaves no room for such "special pro-
visions." They may even argue that the CTB is compatible with
the expensing or "fast" depreciation of capital outlays because
these are mere matters of timing - forgetting that they have in-
sisted on the importance of "mere timing" in criticizing other
"preferences."
V. PROBLEMS oF TIMING
The Simons definition of income does not specify the period of
time to which it is to be applied: that is left to the person who
uses the definition, which refers only to "the beginning and end
of the period in question." Similarly, Haig's definition refers to
the accretion in the taxpayer's economic power "between two
points of time." 51 Simons himself was not much concerned with
the problems of the taxable period, or with the effect on the
Treasury of moving income from one taxable period to another;
and he had little patience for "those who persist in deploring long
postponement of tax payment and the consequent interest cost
to the Treasury," '9 referring to the issue as "this mosquito argu-
58 See p. 932 supra.
11 H. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX RErOR.I 127 (1950); see id. at igS. Simons argued
that the elimination of the special rate for capital gains, coupled with realization at
death, would make the income tax virtually independent of time; taxpayers could
then be allowed to depreciate assets at their discretion, to deduct losses on "wash
sales," and so on. Id. at 44-52. But if time really does not matter, a carryover of
basis generation after generation would be as satisfactory as realization at death,
except for transfers to tax-exempt institutions. It would be interesting to know
if Simons was so tolerant of postponement that he would have accepted "Yankee
storekeeper" accounting: deduct inventory costs when incurred, but take sales into
account only when the customer pays. For a proposal along this line see Carson,
An Investment-Recovery-First Concept of Taxable Profit, 26 AccouN"INo RaV.
456 (195i).
Simons's tolerance of tax postponement was not a peripheral aspect of his tax
theory. The taxing system, he argued, "must not require or presuppose sharp al-
locations of income among short accounting periods ... tax legislation calling
for definitive annual determinations means awful complexity, difficult administra-
tion, expensive compliance, endless litigation, and bad taxpayer and Bureau morale,"
as well as - perhaps this was the worst of all - a "pestilential multiplication" of tax
lawyers. "Income taxation has simply never faced squarely the axiom that an-
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ment." His disciples, however, have not inherited his insouciance;
they have condemned devices by which taxpayers can postpone
the recognition of taxable income from one taxable year to an-
other as "preferences" that are inconsistent with a CTB. Since
these items do not drop out of the tax base entirely, the assertion
that these "preferences" have the effect of "eroding" the tax base
must mean that a CTB is a function of time, as well as of scope.
Even if the tax base includes all appropriate items, then, it is not
"comprehensive" if some of the items are included in the "wrong"
period. As will be seen, however, this concern with timing is not
pursued consistently; if it were, it would require changes in the
existing structure of a far more sweeping character than has been
acknowledged or, perhaps, recognized.
Before we proceed, however, a curious aspect of this area should
be noted. The achievement of a CTB, it is often argued, is de-
sirable because it will afford an opportunity to reduce the upper
bracket rates and thereby mitigate the degree of progression. And
one of the virtues claimed for a less progressive rate structure,
in turn, is that it will reduce the importance of timing. The chain
of reasoning seems to amount to this: postponement devices must
be eliminated in order to create a CTB, which will in turn make
possible a rate structure under which postponement devices will
be innocuous. Notwithstanding this involuted way of returning
to Simons's view that objections to the postponement of income
are no more bothersome than mosquitoes, I intend in the discussion
that follows to accept the contrary premise that timing is im-
portant.
The postponement of tax liabilities by the astute selection of an
accounting method, contractual arrangement, or other device is
often analogized to an interest free loan by the Government to the
taxpayer. Translated into dollars, the value of postponing for
five, ten, or twenty years the payment of a liability of i,ooo dollars
is set out in the following table, depending upon whether the tax-
payer discounts the future at five, ten, fifteen, or twenty percent:
Years 5% 0o% 15% 20%
5 $216 $379 $503 $598
10 386 614 753 838
20 623 851 939 974
nual-income accounting is and should be tentative and provisional." H. SihoNs,
supra at 58-60. The trouble with this line of argument is that no foreseeable
income tax rate structure or general interest rate will make the timing of tax
liabilities irrelevant or unimportant.
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It is often argued that the same aggregate tax burden should be
imposed over a period of time whether income is realized early
or late in the period selected; and proposals have been made to
neutralize the taxpayer's time preference by averaging income
over the period and imputing interest on early tax payments.6
This would reduce the importance of timing, but postponement
would retain some of its charms if the interest rate were inadequate
in the eyes of the individual taxpayer. A rate of five percent,
for example, might seem satisfactory to a conservative fiduciary
or to a public utility; but for many businessmen, a rate of ten or
fifteen percent would be required to take the advantage out of
postponement. And for taxpayers - there must be millions of
them - who are perpetually in debt to personal finance companies,
a rate of twenty-four or thirty percent might be necessary to
achieve the desired result. On the other hand, a rate that is
tailored to the needy or leverage-minded taxpayer would be so
high that other taxpayers would be tempted to adopt devices to
accelerate the realization of income.6 And if an average rate
were to be selected, the Government would be "borrowing" from
some taxpayers (those who accelerate their liabilities) at too high
a rate, at the same time that it was "lending" to others (those
who postpone their liabilities) at too low a rate. I do not mean
to suggest that averaging coupled with interest on early payments
would not mitigate the importance of timing, but I do assert that
the issue would continue to be of major importance. I see no pos-
sibility, with high income tax rates, of reducing the issue to the
mosquito level to which Simons thought it belonged.
The continued importance of timing, even with averaging and
imputed interest on early payments, is further assured because
the "loan" that is obtained by postponing a tax liability has fea-
tures that are overlooked by the academician but critical to the
businessman. Loans from banks and other nongovernmental
lenders can be procured only if the lender is satisfied with the
debtor's financial ability, and are often accompanied by restric-
tions on the borrower's freedom; in the case of loans to corpora-
tions, for example, the salaries to be paid to shareholder-employees
may be limited, dividends may be restricted beyond the limits im-
posed by state law, and the major shareholders may be required to
6°B.g., W. VIcKRBY, supra note 31, at 164-97.
6 For some accounting ramifications of the phenomenon of "prepaid" federal
income taxes see HA. BLACK, INTERPEaiOD ALLOCATON oP CoRPORATF INCO-m
TAXES 72-74 (1966).
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endorse the corporation's notes. The loan that results from a post-
ponement of tax liabilities, by contrast, is obtainable at the bor-
rower's will, regardless of his financial condition, and entails no
restrictions on his freedom. Moreover, it does not appear on his
balance sheet as a liability, and hence does not reduce his power
to get other loans. Finally, an ordinary loan carries a fixed ma-
turity date, imposed by the lender, and is subject to extension
only at his sufferance. Postponed tax liabilities, on the other
hand, become "due" only if the taxpayer takes whatever step
(sale of property, reduction of inventory, change of accounting
method, withdrawal of funds, or liquidation) is required to real-
ize the income in question. Thus, even if interest is imputed on
early tax payments at the same rate that would be paid by the tax-
payer for a commercial loan, he would be well advised to "borrow"
from the Government by postponing his tax liability whenever
possible rather than to borrow from a private lender.6 2
A. The Taxable Period
Income must be measured chronologically. The unit of time
selected by the Internal Revenue Code is the twelve month tax-
able year, not the month, triennium, or decade; and this decision,
though conforming to business custom, is by no means neutral
in its impact, since tax rates are progressive and taxpayers have
a variety of earning cycles. Although the twelve month taxable
year is controlling for most purposes, it is modified by a variety
of carryover provisions, which in turn specify their own chrono-
logical limits. These include section 170(b) (5) (five year carry-
forward of individual taxpayer's excess charitable contributions),
section 172 (three year carryback and five year carryforward of
net operating loss), and section 122(b) (unlimited carryforward
of individual's capital loss). a3
2 One can usefully compare the wide-open "loan" that is obtained by post-
poning the realization of income with the more conventional terms that will be
imposed on a taxpayer by the Collection Division of the IRS if he has incurred a
tax liability but wishes to pay it in installments or at a later time. It is also
instructive to note the extent to which financially pressed businessmen are tempted
to "borrow" government funds by failing to pay over taxes withheld from their
employees' wages on the due date, despite the severe penalty on this practice. See
Stutsman, The Penalty for a "Withholding" of Withholding Taxes, U. So. CA.
x964 TAx INST. 657.
63 Income averaging under §§ 13o-o5 is another exception to the annual ac-
counting principle. For the differential advantages to various categories of tax-
payers resulting from averaging see Steger, Averaging Income for Income Tax
Purposes, 1 5959 COMPENDrM 589, 654-i5.
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I do not recall any suggestion that these modifications of the
twelve month taxable year are "preferences," but I am not sure
why they have escaped these labels. Can it be that existing law -
so deficient, we are told, in so many other ways- has somehow
succeeded in defining the taxable period in a way that is con-
sistent in every respect with a CTB? Or are we to conclude that
the concept of a CTB is independent of time, and that (as Simons
argued) it requires only that all items of income be taken into
account at some time or other, no matter when? If so, what are
we to make of the assertion that the employee who recognizes
income from a qualified pension plan at retirement rather than
when his employer makes contributions is receiving a "prefer-
ence)?
Perhaps the advocates of a CTB object to the delayed recogni-
tion of income from qualified pension plans only because it seems
inconsistent with the twelve month taxable period that usually con-
trols in computing taxable income. If the accretion in the taxpayer's
economic power (Haig's criterion of income) is normally meas-
ured by comparing his wealth on December 31 with his wealth on
January i of the same year, it may be asserted that the same two
points in time ought to be used in measuring the economic growth
resulting from his participation in a qualified pension plan. This
is a persuasive, though perhaps not irrefutable, argument; but it
would carry the advocates of a CTB into territory that they have
hitherto not attempted to invade. Our network of statutory rules
governing tax-free exchanges, as well as the statutory and nonstat-
utory rules of "tax accounting," will require agonizing reap-
praisal - as I will show in a moment - if consistency in applying
the twelve month taxable period is a prerequisite to achieving a
CTB. Moreover, the many carryovers and other exceptions to
the twelve month taxable period that are to be found in existing
law are not easily reconciled with the notion that the same two
points in time must invariably be used in measuring the accre-
tion in economic power that is to be the new measure of taxable
income.
B. Averaging
The effect of the twelve month taxable period may be modified
in the case of income that was earned or accrued over a longer
period of time (as with back pay awards under section 1303 of
pre-1964 law) or that substantially exceeds the taxpayer's average
income during a specified base period (as with sections 1301-05
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of existing law). If the averaging device applies only to a limited
category of income, however, it is not easily squared with the de-
mand, frequently voiced by advocates of a CTB, that income be
taxed "without regard to its source." The "preference" accorded
to capital gains is a rough and ready kind of averaging; neither
the deduction allowed by section 1202 nor the alternative special
tax rate takes account directly of the tax that would have been paid
had the appreciation been measured and taxed in the earlier years,
to be sure, but they are often defended as a simple way of miti-
gating the effect of bunching. This claim would be strengthened
if the holding period were longer, as it was before 1942. By con-
trast, the income averaging provisions of current law do not even
purport to deal with slowly maturing income, and they resemble
the capital gain provisions in modifying the tax rate applicable
to the computation year without regard to the tax that would
have been payable if the averageable income had been received
during the base period.
I have seen no analysis of the implications of the Haig-Simons
definition for income averaging. In the case of income that is
earned over a period of time, there may be a corresponding in-
crease in the taxpayer's net worth to be accounted for annually
under the definition; but if the accretion cannot be measured or
is dependent upon successful completion of the project, the income
would not be reflected in the taxpayer's net worth until the final
year. Tempering the rate of tax in that year to take account of
the income-maturing process seems consistent with the Haig-
Simons formulation (indeed, it might be regarded as an optional
retroactive adoption of accrual accounting), but only if all forms
of slowly maturing income are entitled to this benefit. I am not
sure, however, whether the averaging contemplated by some ad-
vocates of a CTB is to apply to all slowly maturing income re-
gardless of its source, or only to capital gains.
Averaging that takes account of the income-maturing process
does not necessarily do anything for the taxpayer with fluctuating
income, since an "abnormal" amount of income in a given year
may reflect nothing more than that year's activities. A reduction
in the tax rate to mitigate this kind of "bunching" may be con-
sistent with the Haig-Simons definition, but here again it would
seem to be a "preference" - as that term is used by advocates
of a CTB - if only a limited category of income qualifies for the
rate reduction. The income averaging rules of the current Code
(sections 1301-05) are not applicable to capital gains or to in-
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come from property received by gift or bequest during the com-
putation year or base period. Perhaps these disqualifications can
be excused as atoning in some measure for the "preferences" ac-
corded to these types of income; otherwise, they would seem to be
objectionable because they turn on the "source" of the taxpayer's
income.
C. Accounting Methods
Aside from a few peripheral issues, the advocates of a compre-
hensive tax base have not directed their attention to accounting
methods, possibly on the assumption that "exceptions" and "pref-
erences" are not to be found in this area. In point of fact, how-
ever, accounting methods are composed of conventions, primarily
governing the time when items are to be taken into account, that
are often indistinguishable from "substantive" statutory provi-
sions that are thought to deserve pejorative labels. The cash
receipts and disbursements, accrual, installment, completed con-
tract, and percentage of completion methods of reporting income
can produce very different results in any given taxable period, and
these divergencies may continue for many years -possibly for
the full span of the taxpayer's natural or business life.
To illustrate the impact of accounting methods on the CTB
concept, one example will suffice. The installment method of ac-
counting (section 453) permits the taxpayer's gain on a sale of
property to be spread out over the period of collection, even if
the buyer is highly solvent and his obligation to pay is evidenced
by promissory notes or other negotiable instruments. The ration-
ale of this method of accounting, which an authoritative com-
mittee of the American Accounting Association considers too mis-
leading for financial statement purposes, 64 was recently explained
as follows by the Internal Revenue Service: "
The method of reporting income on the installment basis was
enacted by Congress as a relief measure, the idea being that it
would enable merchants to actually receive in cash the profit aris-
ing out of each installment before the tax was paid. In other words,
the tax could be paid from the proceeds collected rather than be
4 Committee on Concepts and Standards Underlying Corporate Financial
Statements, American Accounting Association, Accounting Principles and Taxable
Income, 27 ACCOUJNToNG REV. 427, 429 (1952); see SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4811, 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 72,124 (Dec. 7, i965) (proper reporting of
deferred income tax liability resulting from use of installment basis of computing
income).
65 Rev. Rul. 6g-i85, z965-2 Cum. BULL. 153, 154.
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advanced by the taxpayer .... It is this "ability to pay" con-
cept which underlies the privilege of reporting income on the in-
stallment basis.
If the cash flow theory that underlies this method is acceptable
to the proponents of a CTB, why is it a "preference" to permit
employees to exclude from their gross income the contributions
made by an employer to a qualified pension plan that will not
pay any benefits in cash for many years? If all income is to be
treated "alike," I see no escape from either repealing the install-
ment method of accounting or extending it to all taxpayers. 66
The installment method of section 453 is by no means the only
accounting method that permits the taxpayer to reflect income in
a later year than would be required by a consistent application of
the Haig-Simons principle for measuring the taxpayer's economic
gain, or that is available to some taxpayers but denied to others
similarly situated. The completed contract and percentage of
completion methods of reporting income can be used, under sec-
tion 1.45I-3(a) of the Regulations, only for building, installa-
tion, and construction contracts. Surely the systematic elimina-
tion of "preferences" would require either the abandonment of
these accounting methods or their extension to all contracts taking
more than one year to complete.
Even more basic is the fact that the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting permits the taxpayer to control the
timing of income by accelerating or postponing the receipt and
payment of many items. Deferred compensation arrangements
have been criticized by proponents of a CTB, who recommend that
cash basis taxpayers be put on an accrual basis in this limited
area; but a consistent application of this approach (which also
underlies proposals to include the interest component of life in-
surance savings in the CTB as it accrues) would collide on a
grand scale with the assumptions of cash basis accounting. De-
ferred compensation arrangements are a dramatic illustration of
the "creative" use of cash basis accounting principles by the tax
planner, but they do not begin to exhaust the possibilities.6 7
" For its limited applicability to income from personal services see W.W. Pope,
34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1198 (1965) (carpenter-dealer allowed to use installment
method for houses built and sold by him).
" See Goetz, The Myth of Special Tax Concessions for Qualified Pension Plans,
5 IowA L. REv. 561 (1966), arguing that the cash method of accounting, rather
than "special" legislation, is responsible for the exclusion from the employee's cur-
rent income of employer contributions to qualified pension plans and of the invest-
ment income thereon. Compare the right of cash basis taxpayers to exclude the
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Indeed, a rigorous application of accrual accounting principles
would require some items and transactions to be taken into ac-
count even earlier than the advocates of a CTB have proposed
in their war on "preferences." For example, if social security
benefits are to be stripped of their tax immunity, why wait until
benefits are paid to the employee before requiring him to take them
into account? If his employer bought an annuity for him, the
contribution would be taxable when made under existing law, and
we are asked to extend this rule to qualified pension plans as well.
If this extension is required to achieve a "no preference" tax base,
should not the employee be required to report, when earned, the
present discounted value of social security benefits to be paid in
the future? 65 If Medicare benefits are to lose their immunity,
should not the taxpayer be required to report annually the value
of the protection that is conferred on him, just as he would be
taxed if his employer bought him an accident and health policy
as compensation? There are, to be sure, reasons for not imposing
the tax at this time, but they are not easily squared with the "no
preference" approach.
Not even the pitiless suppression of all accounting methods
other than accrual accounting, however, would give us a tax sys-
tem devoid of "preferences" and "exceptions." In support of this
dismal conclusion, let me simply remind the reader of the many
variations of accrual accounting that are to be found in the Treas-
ury Regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions. 0 Which ones are
interest component of U.S. savings bonds until redemption or maturity, despite
the annual increase in redemption value.
" Of course, the scale of benefits might be revised later, but that can be taken
into account when it occurs; surely few would contend that a downward adjust-
ment of benefits is so likely that the fully insured employee has not experienced
an accretion in net worth. The Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, § 302(a), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 428 (Supp. July 1966), provides that persons previously outside the social security
system are to receive monthly benefits of thirty-five dollars for life on reaching the
age of seventy-two. Would a CTB require such a person to include in income the
fair market value of a comparable annuity (about $5ooo) as soon as he qualifies?
See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821
(igSo) (employee must include in gross income the present value to him of a
nonassignable annuity contract purchased and held for him by his employer).
" Consider, for instance, the pricing of inventories. LIFO was used in valuing
20 of total closing inventories on tax returns filed for fiscal 1963. 25 J. TAXA-
TION 267 (1966). If it is a "preference" that ought to be purged from the compre-
hensive tax base (as Hellmuth, The Corporate Income Tax Base, in i 1959
CoMPENDIUM 283, 312, suggests), it would broaden the base far more than many
targets that are frequently mentioned. Other ambiguities in the term "accrual
accounting" are reflected by the recent debates regarding prepaid income, reserves
for estimated expenses, accrual of vacation pay, dealers' reserves, and disputed
liabilities.
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"exceptions," and to what general rule, I leave to scholars more
skilled than I in this type of taxonomy.
One final thought: if for some reason that escapes me we can
achieve a tax base that is devoid of preferences without hacking
away at accounting methods, it will be necessary to define just
what it is that is to enjoy this immunity from reform. The dif-
ficulty, of course, is that many statutory provisions that bear on
the timing of income could be dressed up as "accounting methods"
and transferred to Subchapter E (Accounting Periods and
Methods of Accounting). Among these are most if not all of the
business deductions mentioned earlier (research and development
expenses, depreciation, and so on), the nonrecognition provisions
discussed below, and such more esoteric provisions as section 77
(commodity loans), section 165(h) (disaster losses), and section
165(e) (theft losses) . 0
D. Unrealized Appreciation
Appreciation in the value of the taxpayer's assets is not included
in gross income under existing law until it has been "realized"
by sale or other disposition. None of the proponents of a CTB,
so far as I know, wants to substitute an annual net worth compu-
tation to take account each year of the taxpayer's increase or de-
crease in wealth. 1 I do not quarrel with this exemption of unreal-
ized appreciation, but it unquestionably tolerates a "preference"
and is inconsistent with the hope of achieving a tax base unsullied
by human compromises. Although Henry Simons acknowledged
that a yearly computation of the taxpayer's net worth was im-
plied by his definition of income, and called the realization con-
cept a "professional conspiracy against truth," 72 he thought that
70 Compare the problem of distinguishing among "accounting method," "ac-
counting practice," and "error" under sections 446 and 481. See Boughner,
Change in Accounting Method, Practice, or Correction of Error? The IRS Posi-
tion, 23 J. TAAON 264 (1965).
71 In 1937, however, an eminent committee that included the president of
Equitable Life Assurance Society and a partner of Sullivan and Cromwell recom-
mended an annual accrual of capital gains and losses; curiously, only the former
chairman of the National Labor Relations Board objected to the taxation of
"paper profits." TwENTrETH CENTURY FUiD, INC., Comm. ON TAXATION, FACING
THE TAX PRO3LEaE 476 n.i5, 477, 490 (C. Shoup ed. X937). Compare the stress on
"realizable profits" and "realized cost savings" in E. EDWARDS & P. BELL, TnE
THEORY AND MEASUREMENT or BvsiNEss INCOME (1961).
72 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcoNm TAXATION 81 (1938). Referring to Seligman's
insistence on realization as a condition to recognizing income while simultaneously
favoring depreciation deductions (to which inventory write-downs and bad debt
reserves might have been added), Simons said: "Surely no definition of income
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no Cworkable scheme" could be devised to reach the theoretically
correct result. He was not explicit about his reason for this con-
clusion, however, except for the statement that income taxation
"simply must follow, in the main, the established procedures of
accounting practice.
7 3
Perhaps this source of "erosion" in the CTB is to be tolerated
because of the difficulty of valuing the taxpayer's assets each year.
In point of fact, of course, we somehow manage to value assets
of almost every description in computing the gain or loss on tax-
able in-kind exchanges and in applying gift and death taxes; and
Simons, like many other advocates of a CTB, wanted transfers
by gift and at death to be treated as taxable realizations of gain,
thus accepting the responsibility of valuing the assets at that
which admits 'mere value changes' only in one direction can well escape the fate
of appearing ridiculous." Id. at 88. As to the phrase "inchoate income," coined
by Seligman as a label for unrealized appreciation, Simons said that it "deserves
prominent place among the curiosities of economic terminology." Id. at 87.
Id. at 2o8. Thus, Simons in the end joined the "professional conspiracy
against truth," or at least abdicated in favor of accounting procedures that he pro-
foundly distrusted: "The reputable accountant never loses sight of the fact that his
income statements are influential in matters of dividend policy. Income, for him,
is perhaps only what may be reported safely to unsophisticated directors as income.
He aims, it would seem, never to ascertain what income is, in any really definable
sense, but rather to devise rules of calculation which will make the result a mini-
mum or at least give large answers only in the future." Id. at Si. In point of fact,
although some accountants may try to protect "unsophisticated directors" by re-
fusing to count chickens before they are grandparents, others are told by their
clients whether an optimistic or pessimistic income statement is wanted. See
Briloff, Needed: A Revolution in the Determination and Application of Account-
ing Principles, 39 ACCOUNTING Rav. 12 (1964); Cohen, Accounting for Taxes,
Finance, and Regulatory Purposes-Are Variances Necessary?, 44 TAXs 780
(I966). Accounting principles often come in pairs or sets, from which management
can select those that will yield the most useful financial statements. Consistency
from year to year is about all that can be expected, and even this is not essential if
the inconsistency is disclosed in a footnote.
As to the treatment of unrealized appreciation by accountants, it is interesting to
compare the vigorous assertion that appreciation and depreciation in market values
must be recognized in order to measure net revenue in W. PATON & R. STavENSoN,
PRixciPLEs or ACCOUrTnrG 238-43, 451-69 (i928), with Paton's equally firm as-
sertion twenty years later that "appreciation in its various forms is not income."
W. PATON & A. LIr=EToN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CosoRATE ACcoUNT1G STANDARDS
46, 62-63 (American Accounting Ass'n Monograph No. 3, I940); see Income
Measurement in a Dynamic Economy, in FivF MONORPHS oN BusnTEss INCOME
57 (S. Alexander ed. i95o) ("the accountant's use of realized rather than accrued
gain is based principally on convenience"); Litherland, Fixed Asset Replacement a
Half Century Ago, 26 ACCOUNTING R V. 475 (195); AIA, STUDY GROUP ON BUSI-
NESS INCOME, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF BusIEss INCOME 23-24 (1952). For a
contemporary proposal to take unrealized appreciation into account currently see
E. EDwARos & P. BELL, supra note 71, at 276-77.
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time.74 Moreover, once the giant step of taxing unrealized ap-
preciation was taken for the first year, it would produce a grand
list of values, and later changes in value might be satisfactorily
approximated by index figures based on economic trends (sub-
ject to rebuttal evidence at the taxpayer's option). The first year,
in other words, would be the hardest. At the very least, before
accepting the "special exception" or "loophole" that is created
by the exclusion of unrealized appreciation from gross income, the
advocates of a CTB might be expected to examine the possibility
of applying to this area the principle used elsewhere in the tax
field: value those assets that do have an ascertainable market
value, and hold the others in abeyance until valuation becomes
feasible. This is what the proposed taxation of life insurance
savings by requiring the annual increase in the policy's terminal
reserve or cash surrender value to be reported would amount to.75
If the exclusion of this type of unrealized appreciation erodes the
tax base, what is the rationale for excluding other readily measur-
able appreciation?
Perhaps unrealized appreciation is to be excluded from the
proposed CTB not because of anticipated difficulty in valuing as-
sets but because "paper profits" produce no cash to pay the tax
and may be wiped out in a later year. These are not untenable
grounds for exempting unrealized appreciation, but they furnish
equally persuasive support for other exclusions as well. One ex-
ample: employees get no ready cash when their employer con-
tributes on their behalf to a qualified pension or profit-sharing
plan, and they will be involuntarily at the the risk of the market
until the benefits are paid in cash. Why not, then, preserve the
employee's right under existing law to exclude the employer's
contribution from gross income; it is a "preference," to be sure,
but so is the exclusion of unrealized appreciation. Indeed, if
lack of cash and continued risk of the market are legitimate
grounds for taking appreciation into income only when it is real-
ized, why should we not amend existing law to allow employees
to deduct or exclude from gross income their contributions to pen-
sion plans and their social security taxes? 71 The employee's claim
is not properly answered by the assertion that he wants a "prefer-
74 H. Smoxs, supra note 72, at 167.
7 See Irenas, Life Insurance Interest Income Under the Federal Income Tax, 21
TAx L. REV. 297, 314 (1966).
" In computing "personal income," the National Income Division excludes
both employee and employer contributions for social insurance. U.S. DEP'T oF
CoinaRcE, supra note So, at S.
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ence" while the investor is getting only what natural law requires.
The employee, in fact, is in the usual case asking only for post-
ponement; under existing law, the investor's unrealized apprecia-
tion will be excluded from income permanently if he holds the
property until death.
E. Realization of Gain or Loss on Transfer at Death or by Gift
Advocates of a CTB ordinarily propose to take account of un-
realized appreciation and depreciation when property is trans-
ferred by gift or at death. In this way, they would convert the
outright exemption enjoyed by such appreciation under existing
law into a postponement provision. For a taxpayer who is fifty
years old, a current increase in net worth would not be reported
for twenty-four years if his life conforms to the 1958 Standard
Ordinary Mortality Table; for thirty-five and sixty-five year-old
taxpayers, the corresponding figures are thirty-seven and thirteen
years. The value of postponing payment of a tax liability of
i,ooo dollars for these periods of time, assuming various interest
rates, is set out in the following table:
Years 5% 1o% 15% 20%
13 $470 $710 $838 $906
24 69o 898 965 988
37 836 971 994 999
If it is an unwarranted "preference" to allow employees to post-
pone the recognition of currently earned pensions and annuities
until they start to receive payments on retiring from active serv-
ice, realization at death also deserves the label "preference"
even though it would constitute an important reform of existing
law.
One need hardly add that the only version of realization at
death that has been so far unveiled -the 1963 proposal of the
Kennedy Administration- was a mere sieve when measured by
the criterion of "treating all income alike." 77 Even this proposal,
1 7 Some property was excluded entirely and granted a basis equal to its fair
market value at death (personal residence and household effects) ; a carryover basis
was provided for one-half the assets transferred to a surviving spouse; life insur-
ance was not included; no provision was made for recapturing percentage depletion
deductions in excess of the property's basis; and there was a minimum exemption
(with a stepped-up basis) for $15,ooo of unrealized appreciation. Hearings on the
President's x963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., ist Sess., pt. z, at 128-40 (1963). I do not quarrel with these ex-
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however, encountered such heavy weather that it was replaced by
a plan for a carryover of the decedent's basis, so that the gain
would go untaxed until the taxpayer's heirs sold or exchanged the
property in a market transaction. This modest suggestion - a
"preference" proposed as a substitute for a "preference" that in
turn would have only diluted a more formidable "preference" 8
- also failed to survive the House Ways and Means Committee's
examination. Resistance to change in this area is so great that any
reform, even a carryover of basis for inherited property, may be
seen as a victory for the CTB ideal, justifying a ruthless elimina-
tion of "preferences" in other areas. A clear-eyed view of the
landscape, however, would disclose that neither a carryover of
basis nor realization at death would be more than a halfway house
on the road to a truly comprehensive base.
F. Tax-Free Exchanges and Similar Transactions
In addition to exempting appreciation in the value of the tax-
payer's property from his gross income if it is not realized by a
sale or other disposition, existing law is riddled with provisions
for the nonrecognition of the gain even if it is realized. These non-
recognition provisions, which may be regarded as "exceptions" in
the sense that their repeal would result in taxability of the tax-
payer's realized gain under section 61 (a), are usually mandatory,
but some are optional with the taxpayer. Among the most im-
portant are the following:
(r) section 351 (transfer of property to a controlled corporation);
(2) section 354 (exchange of stock or securities in a corporate re-
organization, such as a merger or stock-for-stock acquisition);
(3) section io31 (exchange of business or of investment property
other than stock, securities, or inventory assets for other prop-
erty "of a like kind," e.g., an exchange of industrial equip-
ment or of investment real estate);
(4) section 1033 (replacement of property lost by "involuntary
conversion," such as condemnation or fire, with other property
"similar or related in service or use"); and
emptions, but I should think they would be intolerable to anyone who worries
about the erosion of the tax base resulting from the exclusion of welfare payments.
7 Although it has been asserted that a carryover of basis "would accomplish
the same result" as constructive realization at death, Somers, The Case for a
Capital Gain Tax at Death, 52 A.B.A.J. 346, 347 (x966), they can be regarded as
equivalents only if one assumes with Simons, see p. 958 & note 59 supra, that
timing does pt matter.
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(5) section 1034 (sale of the taxpayer's principal residence at a
gain if another residence is acquired within one year).
In addition to nonrecognition provisions, of which the foregoing
are merely a sample, the Code contains a number of other pro-
visions that operate similarly, though not under the same technical
label. Examples are section 3o5, excluding stock dividends from
gross income, and section io8, permitting the taxpayer to exclude
income realized on the cancellation of his indebtedness for less
than its face amount if he agrees to reduce the tax basis of his
assets.
The policy underpinnings of these provisions are several in
number, and they overlap in part. Some nonrecognition trans-
actions are forced on the taxpayer, and some of these he may
regard as misfortunes rather than profitable events. Whether
the transaction is voluntary or not, he ordinarily either receives
no cash or promptly uses any cash received to replace the assets
that were disposed of, so that the imposition of a tax might compel
him to sell other assets, to borrow, or to take some other incon-
venient or uneconomic step. Often he does not wholly liquidate
his economic interest in the assets given up, or he acquires an in-
terest in similar property, so his profit is arguably a paper one.
Another rationale for the nonrecognition provisions is a Congres-
sional intent to encourage, or to eliminate barriers to, business ad-
justments, labor mobility, or other economic or personal be-
havior.
These all strike me as legitimate reasons for the nonrecognition
provisions, and as to some transactions I find them persuasive or
conclusive; but to those who envision a tax base without "prefer-
ences" or "exceptions," this attitude must seem fuzzy-minded if
not downright pusillanimous. To be sure, the taxpayer's gain
usually goes unrecognized only at the expense of a carryover of
his basis, so that the unrecognized gain will be taken into account
if he disposes of the property in a taxable transaction at a later
date; but this postponement of income is itself a "preference."
Moreover, nonrecognition in today's tax structure often leads to
the exclusion of gain by reason of the stepped-up basis conferred
on the property at death. Even if this "super-preference" were
eliminated by a watertight requirement of realization of gain at
death, however, the nonrecognition provisions would remain as an
important source of "erosion."
Curiously, however, the nonrecognition provisions have been
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little assailed by the advocates of a CTB. Criticism of details has
been plentiful, but there has been no parallel in this area to the
vigorous and nearly unanimous assault on such "preferences" as
the exclusion of wage supplements or social security benefits. The
economists, viewing the nonrecognition provisions from macro-
economic heights, may have thought them of minor importance;
but it can be confidently predicted that their repeal would be as
unpopular as restricting percentage depletion. 9 Even if the tax
base were expanded by rules for realization of gain at death, the
nonrecognition provisions would surely retain much of their ap-
peal; indeed, given a choice, many individual taxpayers (as well
as corporations and trusts) would undoubtedly prefer realization
at death to a repeal of the nonrecognition provisions.
VI. THE TAXABLE UNIT
Before we can measure the "economic accretion" to which the
"broad base" income tax is to be applied, we must specify the
taxpaying unit whose economic betterment we want to measure.
The "individual" income tax of existing law is not quite what its
name implies; it is imposed on some income of trusts and estates,
as well as on the income of individuals. Moreover, of the 64 mil-
lion "individual" returns filed during 1965, 38 million were joint
returns of married persons reporting their combined incomes.
For some purposes, the taxpayer is regarded by existing law as
an isolated unit; thus, he must report gain realized on a sale of
property even if the buyer is his wife or child. For other purposes,
however, account is taken of the taxpayer's marital and family
relationships: witness the separate rate structures for married
couples, surviving spouses with dependent children, and heads of
households; the dependency exemptions; the deductions allowed
for medical expenses of the taxpayer's dependents and for alimony
payments; the disallowance of losses on intrafamily transactions;
and the effect of marriage on the numerous dollar and percentage
limitations on deductions and other allowances. Our tax structure
is similarly ambivalent as regards relations between the taxpayer
and business or other economic entities in which he is finan-
cially interested. Sometimes the income of such entities is im-
" Since the average holding period for capital assets is probably longer for
high bracket taxpayers, L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL.
GArns AND Lossas 142-44 (1951) (1934-I937 statistics), the value of the realization
concept, tax-free exchange provisions, and other postponement opportunities no
doubt increases as we go up the economic ladder.
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puted to the individual, sometimes his income and the entity's
are computed as though they had nothing to do with each other,
and sometimes there are separate computations that partially re-
flect an identity of economic interest. Although statutory pro-
visions taking account of, or disregarding, family or economic
relationships are sometimes said to "erode" the tax base, I think
these claims stem from an inadequate analysis of the problem and
that in reality the concept of a CTB is quite independent of the
choice of taxpaying units.
A. Family Relationships
To begin with, I find nothing in the CTB concept that leads
inexorably, or even points vaguely, to the conclusion that the in-
come of individuals should be taxed, rather than the income of
married couples, families, or households, or that tells us anything
about the extent to which tax rates should take account of mar-
riage bonds or family responsibilities. Since the tax base could
be enlarged to include every item that constitutes "income" under
the Haig-Simons definition even though the rate structure differ-
entiated between single persons and married couples, why is the
income-splitting joint return of existing law classified as a
"leakage" or source of "erosion" by some advocates of a CTB? 80
8
"E.g., Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, io NXAT'L TAX . 1, 21
(957); Heller, The Federal Income Tax and the Working Man, in CIO CONFER-
ENCE oN TAXA17ON 21, 23 (1953). Pechman, however, points out that the income-
splitting issue "cannot be resolved on a priori grounds," and hence offers alternative
calculations of the revenue yield obtainable by eliminating leakages, dependent on
whether income-splitting is permitted or not. What Would a Comprehensive Indi-
vidual Income Tax Yield?, in 1 1959 COMPENDIUM 251, 276. As pointed out in the
text, however, an admission that the Haig-Simons definition is compatible with a
structure that reduces the tax liability when a wealthy bachelor gets married is a
dangerous concession for the advocates of a CTB. It clearly implies that the Haig-
Simons definition is equally compatible with other adjustments of the tax liability
to the taxpayer's marital or family status.
Simons himself was ambivalent on this issue. He asserted that "it would be hard
to maintain that the raising of children is not a form of consumption on the part
of parents" and that consequently no more should be allowed than "small, fixed
credits" for minor children and other dependents who are incapable of self-support.
H. Smiuois, supra note 72, at 140, 141. At the same time, however, he conceded,
id. at 137-38, that:
It seems reasonable enough that the credits for, at least, minor dependents
should vary directly with the family income. This might be arranged-as
indeed was done under the German Reichseinkommensteuer-by providing
minimum and maximum credits per child, together with a credit expressed
as a percentage of income between those limits. It may also seem reasonable
that adult members of a taxpayer's household should be taxed with respect
to that part of the joint consumption expenses attributable to them (less
contributions by them), with deduction of the amounts so imputed in de-
termining the taxable income of the householder. Consistency, of course, would
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Although they are not as explicit on this point as one would wish,
their objection to income-splitting evidently is that it violates their
theory that the income tax should not take account of the way tax-
payers choose to spend their income. In this view, I take it, a
single man's tax should not be reduced by his acquisition of a wife
any more than by his acquisition of a yacht.
This is one way of looking at life, of course, but it is surely not
the only one, and others might conclude that tax distinctions based
on marriage or other family responsibilities are of a different order
from those based on the taxpayer's other expenditure choices.
And if it be admitted that a CTB does not forbid taking account
of family responsibilities by variations in the rate structure, I
perceive no reason why a CTB is not equally consistent with the
use of exclusions, deductions, or credits as the means of achieving
the desired differentials.
In fact, even those who find it difficult or impossible to dis-
tinguish between the taxpayer's support of his wife and children
and his other "personal" expenditures should not, in my opinion,
move directly to the conclusion that all tax variations based on
family responsibilities must be extirpated. An intervening ques-
tion must be answered: whose income is being used for the "con-
sumption" we are talking about? It is at least arguable that what
we choose to call the husband's income is not "his" to the extent
that he is required by law to use it for the support of his wife or
children -that he is merely a conduit pro tanto, so that this
portion of his earnings should be reported by, and taxed to, the
wife or child. If married couples think of themselves as equally
entitled to their combined income, how do the tax rates appli-
cable to joint returns "erode" the tax base? If the husband's in-
come is 25,ooo dollars and the wife's zero, their tax on a joint
return is less than a single person must pay on 25,000 dollars; but
it is the same as the tax on two single persons with 12,5oo dollars
of income each.
Some commentators compare the husband with 25,ooo dollars
of income to the bachelor with the same income, saying that they
have merely chosen to spend their money in different ways, and
that their choices are irrelevant to a tax on disposable income.
Others may find it more persuasive to compare the married couple
to two unmarried persons with 12,5oo dollars of income each;
whether the couple resides in a community property state or not,
require the authorization of generous deductions with respect to amounts con-
tributed to the support of persons outside the household.
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marriage creates emotional, social, and legal claims so that the
husband's salary is not "his" in the same sense that the salary of
an unmarried taxpayer with no close relatives belongs to him. On
this theory, if there are children, part of the husband's income
"belongs" to them, not to him. Laymen are usually more legalistic
than lawyers, and this bias may lead them to emphasize the hus-
band's "right" to his salary and other income; but the insights
of domestic life ought to dispel this preoccupation with legal con-
cepts.
So far as I can tell, its advocates think that a CTB is consistent
with allowing alimony to be deducted by the husband and re-
ported by the ex-wife. If this is not a "leakage," would it be
equally consistent with the Haig-Simons definition to allow a tax-
payer to deduct amounts paid for the support of his wife and
children, provided these amounts were reported by the recipient?
Like alimony, these obligations stem from the fateful, but volun-
tary, decision to marry; and in both cases the taxpayer may have
married in haste only to repent at leisure. Perhaps the tolerance
shown toward alimony reflects the fact that the amount to be
paid- the cost of support- has been fixed by an arm's-length
agreement or by a court, while there is no such reliable basis for
allocating a part of the husband's income to his wife or children
during the pendency of the marriage; this ground would imply
that some of the husband's income ought to be deductible by him
and taxed to his wife or children, if only a satisfactory measure
of the obligation of support were at hand. If so, it might be better
to do what we can to allocate something (whether by a formal de-
duction coupled with inclusion in the recipient's income, as with
alimony, or by some other means, such as a manipulation of the
rate structure, exemption, or credit) rather than do nothing at
all. In any event, tolerance of the alimony deduction suggests a
sound, if unacknowledged, lack of assurance in the family-as-
consumption theory - an implicit admission that support of one's
family, though undertaken voluntarily,"' should not be classed
with the taxpayer's other consumption expenditures.
I do not mean to suggest that the joint return rate schedule, the
dependency exemption, or any other structural provision of this
area is immune to criticism or preferable to alternatives. What I
do assert, however, is that the concept of a CTB is of no assistance
in selecting the taxpaying unit. A decision to include every dollar
81 It might also be noted here that a legal duty of support may devolve in-
voluntarily on the taxpayer, for example in the case of indigent parents.
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of economic betterment in someone's gross income does not help
us to designate the appropriate someone. And a statutory pro-
vision can be an "exception" or a "preference" only if we have
an agreed-upon standard.
B. Partnerships, Corporations, and Trusts
The ambiguity of the term "income" is encountered again when
we ask if a taxpayer enjoys a "net accretion to" his "economic
power" (Haig's formulation) when a partnership, trust, corpora-
tion, or other entity in which he is financially interested engages
in profitable transactions. In the case of partnerships, the Internal
Revenue Code requires each partner to report his share of the
firm's profits, whether it is distributed to him or not. Ordinarily,
of course, he has the legal right to compel a distribution, but an
exercise of this right would often disrupt the business and his
relations with his partners; and sometimes the partnership agree-
ment permits a distribution of profits only by majority or unani-
mous vote of the partners. Since the Internal Revenue Code takes
no account of practical or legal restrictions on the partner's right
to withdraw his share of the firm's income, he is in effect taxed on
"economic enhancement" rather than on the amount available
to him for personal expenditures.
A shareholder of a corporation, however, is not taxed on its
income until it is distributed to him, and this means no tax at all
at the shareholder level if he holds the stock until death. (The
corporation, of course, is taxed on its income as realized; but the
aggregate burden of a corporate tax on the corporation's income
and a personal tax on such gains as are distributed or otherwise
realized by the shareholder may exceed or fall short of, but will
almost certainly not correspond to, the tax that would have been
paid if the same income had been realized by a partnership or in-
dividual proprietorship.) In contrast to the partnership, then, the
corporation shields the shareholder against the individual income
tax so long as the income is accumulated. And it does this even if
the shareholder owns all of the stock and can withdraw the profits
at will; spendable receipts are what count, not economic enhance-
ment or even legal control over the profits. Natural law does not
dictate this distinction between partnerships and corporations; in
the case of two categories of corporations - foreign personal
holding companies and foreign corporations realizing Subpart F
income - the shareholder is taxed on his share of the corpora-
tion's undistributed income. Moreover, the existence of section
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531 is a constant reminder of the intimate relationship between
a corporation's profits and the tax status of its shareholders.
Trusts and estates fall between partnerships and corporations
as respects the tax treatment of accumulated income: sometimes
it is taxed to the beneficiaries even though not distributed to them
(as with partners), but sometimes it is not taxed to them until
distribution (as with shareholders). There are also circumstances
in which trust income is taxed to the grantor of the trust, even
though it cannot be distributed to him, because of the "non-
economic" satisfactions he obtains by dedicating the income to
the beneficiaries of the trust.82
In short, in its treatment of the taxpayer's financial interest in
business and other entities, existing law wobbles between spend-
able receipts and economic enhancement as the criterion of in-
come, and occasionally it fixes instead on vicarious enjoyment as
controlling. We are sometimes told that some minor threads in
this tangled web of rules are "preferences" that "erode" the tax
base, the implicit premise being that the CTB concept implies
a set of rules governing the attribution of entity income to the
persons beneficially interested. Despite these fragmentary an-
nouncements, I know of no attempt to explain why a CTB is
consistent with some attribution rules and not with others, nor any
effort to spin out the implications that are thought to reside in this
concept by systematically identifying the provisions in today's
tax law that would have to be changed to achieve a CTB.
If corporate stock owned by the taxpayer were to be valued at
the beginning and end of each taxable period in order to take the
net accretion in unrealized gain or loss into account, as the Haig-
Simons formulation seems to require, no other steps to reflect the
taxpayer's interest in the corporation would be required. If un-
realized appreciation or depreciation is to be disregarded, how-
ever, we might expect the advocates of a CTB to explore the milder
measure of imputing the realized corporate income to the share-
holders. There are obstacles in the way of doing so, of course, and
the separate corporate tax may be viewed as rough compensation
for failing to tax the shareholders; but this apology is just another
way of saying that a CTB can be no more than a faintly flicker-
ing, far-off ideal. As to trusts, I presume (in the absence of an
unequivocal statement by the CTB experts) that beneficiaries are
to be taxed on income that is allocated to them, whether distrib-
uted or not. The status of the undistributed income of dis-
82 See pp. 946-47 supra on the relationship of vicarious enjoyment to a CTB.
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cretionary trusts, under the Haig-Simons formulation, is less clear.
Perhaps it is income without a taxpayer, to be held in abeyance
until the beneficiary who will receive it can be identified and taxed.
There is little justification for taxing it to the fiduciary except as
an interim measure, to be followed by an adjustment (additional
tax or refund) when the real party in interest becomes identifiable.
To the economists, this may seem obvious enough; but I suspect
that the ABA Tax Section's Committee on Substantive Tax Re-
form will not be very comfortable with this application of the
principle of "taxing all income equally."
Without claiming prescience, I venture to predict that many
advocates of a CTB will draw back from the logical consequences
of the idea that "economic enhancement" should be taxed wher-
ever it can be identified, and will propose or acquiesce in an excep-
tion for the undistributed income of corporations and trusts. The
justification that is likely to be offered for this exception is that the
undistributed income of these entities is not presently available
for expenditure by their shareholders or beneficiaries (except by
selling or borrowing against their interests), and that it may never
be distributed to them because it remains at the risk of the entity's
activities. Fair enough. But cannot the same be said of the em-
ployer's contribution to a qualified pension plan, or even of the
employee's own contribution if it is mandatory? And would the
enemies of preferences be equally complacent if the personal
holding company provisions were amended to permit the personal
service income of movie stars - or of law professors and factory
workers - to be accumulated in a corporation free of the in-
dividual income tax? My bones are not sensitive to the threat of
rainy weather, but they tell me that this proposal would "erode"
the tax base. But why would it, if an incorporated storekeeper is
not taxed on his corporation's earnings until they are distributed
to him?
Although the CTB concept thus implies a group of changes in
the individual tax structure that are much more far-reaching than
its advocates have acknowledged, it leaves us without guidance in
a closely related area of the "taxable unit" problem, the separate
corporation income tax. Just as the Haig-Simons formulation re-
quires the taxable period to be specified without shedding any
light on the criteria to be used in fixing a period, so it seems to
require the taxable unit whose economic accretion is at stake to
be prescribed by criteria that are not part of the definition of in-
come. If the unit is selected on the basis of such "outside"
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criteria, however, it evidently follows that we can have a CTB
whether corporations are taxed as separate entities or not. If so,
the assertion that the dividends-received exclusion erodes the tax
base 11 is puzzling: why is it not a partial nullification of a separate
corporate tax that was not a necessary part of a CTB to begin
with?
More important, is the tax base "eroded" if corporations are
classified into categories (ordinary business corporations, personal
holding companies, insurance companies, commercial banks, and
so on) with the income of each category being computed and taxed
in a manner - and at a rate - thought to be suited to its func-
tion in the nation's economy? If all incorporated taxpayers must
be treated alike in order to achieve a CTB, today's rules will have
to be drastically reformed at a variety of points that have not yet
been identified for us by the CTB advocates. If, on the other
hand, the aim of "taxing all income alike" is compatible with
separate taxing systems or separate rate structures for insurance
companies, personal holding companies, mutual savings banks,
and commercial banks, I do not see why this aim is not equally
consistent with taxing mining corporations differently from manu-
facturers, business executives differently from ministers, and
married persons differently from bachelors.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This attempt to work out the implications of the "no preference,
comprehensive base" approach in a systematic way, and thus to
ascertain where it would take us if it were converted from a slogan
into a program for action, has led me to these conclusions:
(i) The systematic elimination of "preferences" in order to
achieve a truly "comprehensive" base would require many more
fundamental changes in existing law than are usually acknowl-
edged. Among the areas that would be drastically affected by a
whole-hearted use of the Haig-Simons definition are: mortality
gains on life insurance; governmental benefits furnished in kind
or in services; recoveries in suits for personal injury or death;
charitable gifts to individuals; personal and dependency exemp-
tions; tax-exempt organizations; the investment credit; deduction
or rapid amortization of business assets; depreciation below
"
3 E.g., Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, ,o NAT'L TAX J. I,
12 (1957). I mean to imply not that the dividend exclusion is a desirable provision,
but that the CTB concept sheds no light on the issue.
[VOL. 80:925
HeinOnline -- 80 Harv. L. Rev.  980 1966-1967
A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE
market values; inventory pricing; accounting methods; and tax-
free exchanges. Some of these areas seem to have been disre-
garded by the proponents of the CTB, and others have not re-
ceived the attention their importance deserves.
(2) At many points, the most enthusiastic proponents of a CTB
have drawn back from its implications: they almost always ad-
vocate the exclusion from gross income of unrealized annual net
worth increases, gifts and bequests, and imputed income from
personal services, and support allowances for such personal ex-
penditures as charitable contributions and medical care; and some
also favor provisions to encourage investment, such as the invest-
ment credit or rapid depreciation. Their reasons for departing
from the Haig-Simons definition are, in my opinion, no different
from the reasons that are offered in support of all of the "pref-
erences" of existing law: the necessity or desirability of avoiding
difficulties in valuation or enforcement, of stimulating economic
growth, of encouraging behavior thought to be socially useful, of
alleviating economic hardship, of retaining the freedom of choice
that results from use of tax concessions rather than some other
governmental mechanism, or of pursuing other social policies. I
dare say that they would give similar reasons for favoring perpet-
uation of many other preferences of existing law if they were
required to express an opinion on all of those mentioned in this
article. 4 In short, they harbor, in my opinion, the same attitude
" See L. EISENSTmN, THE IDFOLOGIES OF TAxATi"x 193, 197-98 (196i):
Scholars who are hot for certainties .... must have answers if they are to
be happy, and the answers must derive from some uniform standard which is
objectively applied. Besides, the term "loophole" has become too charged with
emotional overtones for the staid world of tax scholarship. . . . And so the
scholars have turned to other words that are supposedly less partial and hence
more informative.
There are enough words to please everybody who wishes to appear im-
personal and detached. Instead of loopholes the enlightened now speak of
"erosions" of the tax base. Or they refer to special treatments and special
provisions, special deductions and special exclusions, special exceptions and
special accommodations, differentials and preferentials, discrepancies and dis-
criminations, openings and leakages, tax shelters and tax havens, tax favors
and tax advantages, tax mitigations and tax concessions. All these words, as
well as others now in fashion, disclose a marked capacity for devising polite
synonyms. They produce an air of impartial judgment. To call percentage
depletion a loophole is to indulge in a personal prejudice. To call it an erosion
is to make an objective appraisal ....
My inquiry into loopholes confirms anew a familiar truth. Better answers
require wiser questions. Ultimately dispensations for certain taxpayers are con-
demned, not because they conform to some definition of a loophole, but be-
cause they are considered undesirable for various reasons. . . . We cannot
learn very much by asking what is a loophole. The only meaningful questions
are those which focus on the precise purposes and effects of a dispensation. Of
course, the answers will vary, for they will reflect different standards of good
and evil . . . . No larger wisdom is discernible.
The following extract from Report Supporting Resolutions on Substantive Tax
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toward the Haig-Simons definition of income that Congress is said
to exhibit toward our progressive rate schedule: a declaration of
faith, combined with advocacy or tolerance of numerous excep-
tions, each of which inures to the benefit of a "special" group of
taxpayers.
(3) If I am right in asserting that most professed supporters of
the CTB concept favor a host of important departures from the
Haig-Simons standard, there ought to be an equally drastic re-
vision of their rhetoric, including a renunciation of the claim that
we can or should eliminate all, or even most, "preferences" and
"special provisions" from the Internal Revenue Code. This means
not that all provisions of existing law are equally good, but rather
that we cannot avoid an examination of each one on its merits in
a discouragingly inconclusive process that can derive no significant
assistance from a "no preference" presumption that would at best
be applied only on a wholly selective basis. Put another way, there
are "preferences" and "preferences"; some are objectionable,
some are tolerable, some are unavoidable, and some are indis-
pensable. A truly "comprehensive" base, in short, would be a dis-
aster.
It may be argued that the rhetoric of the CTB approach does
not matter; we are used to political slogans and exhortations that
contain a kernel of truth and do no harm even though they promise
more than they can deliver. What concerns me is that the rhetoric
Reform, BULL. ABA SECnoN or TAuXA.TION, July 1963 (Annual Report), at 5,
12-13, would have been admirable grist for Eisenstein's mill:
There can be no wavering from a resolute determination that what is really
income must be taxed without exception. Once there is a compromise with
principle or a yielding to pressure to admit a special exception, the hole in the
dike widens. All efforts at real reform go for nought. Having stated this broad
proposition, however, one should note certain possible exceptions: for example,
certain tax exempt organizations could continue their exempt status as under
present rules; there could be a deferment of recognition of income in certain
exchanges and corporate reorganizations; and such deferment might be ex-
tended to cover sales of property followed by reinvestment in comparable
property.
I suspect that much of the enthusiasm for rigorous "broad base" reform among
academicians would prove equally evanescent if subjected to cross-examination.
Take, for example, these recommendations in JoINT EcoNoMIc CoErrE, 89TH
CONG., IST SESS., FISCAL POLICY ISSUES OF THE COMING DECADE (Comm. Print
1965): "broad-based, flat tax on all gross income" (Brown, in id. at 11, 14) ; "an
adjusted gross income tax if possible" (Buchanan, in id. at 19, 21); "a general
broadening of the tax base to include all forms of income" (Eisner, in id. at 42, 44) ;
"[a tax] preferably on adjusted gross income with minor exemptions" (Groves, in
id. at 61). I suggest that these shorthand expressions would, if expanded, trans-
late into a somewhat broader tax base than we now have, but with a host of major
and minor exclusions and deductions retained, rather than into a rigorous applica-
tion of the Haig-Simons definition.
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will foster changes in the tax structure not because they are de-
sirable in themselves, but merely because they will broaden the
base. Since I am convinced that a full-fledged CTB will, and
should, remain miles away, I see no automatic advantage in
moving a few feet in its direction. It is a truism that existing law
bears more heavily on earned income than on income from invest-
ments, and I venture the judgment that the base-broadening pro-
visions that are most likely to be enacted in the pursuit of a CTB
would enlarge rather than narrow this disparity.
(4) To the extent that a departure from the Haig-Simons
definition is compelled by administrative difficulties (valuation,
enforcement, and the like) rather than by its contribution to a
social or economic goal, the advocates of the CTB have given too
little attention to the paradox of the "second best." s1 I take it
that one of the virtues they see in the Haig-Simons definition is
that its rigorous application would lead to an "ideal" distribution
of the tax burden, by measuring the ability to pay that arises from
"income" in the most accurate way."6 If this is their view, it would
be appropriate to quantify the tax burden distribution that would
result from a rigorous application of the definition by taking into
account, at the best estimates available, such difficult items as
annual increases in net worth, imputed income from personal as-
sets, housewives' services, and gifts and bequests. Even if the
valuation problems are too formidable to justify inclusion of
these items in the tax structure itself on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer
basis, a rough and ready estimate would be better than nothing
15 Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. EcoN.
STUDIES i (1956).
"eSee H. Simors, supra note 72, at Io5-c-6: "Since the devices of accounting
and tax legislation contemplate only very rough approximation to income, it is
decisively important to see behind these methods of calculation an 'ideal income,'
calculable by different and less practicable methods. Only on the basis of some
broader conception is it possible to criticize and evaluate merely practicable proce-
dures and to consider fruitfully the problem of bettering the system of presump-
tions." Accord, R. MuSORAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 165 (1959). (But
Musgrave, id. at 165, refers to the "excellent analysis" of the income concept in
N. KATDOR, AN ExPENDrruRE TAx (19s5), which concludes, at 70, that "the problem
of defining individual income, quite apart from any problem of practical measure-
ment, appears in principle insoluble.") See White, Consistent Treatment of Items
Excluded and Omitted from the Individual Income Tax Base, in i 1959 CoPr.N-
DIUr 317 ("Aside from practical difficulties in administration, the base of the in-
dividual income tax ought never, or hardly ever, to be determined on any criterion
other than that of consistency with the economic [Simons] definition of personal
income"); H. BRAZER, A PROGRAf FOR FEDERAL TAx REvISION 7 (196o); Blum,
Federal Income Tax Reform- Twenty Questions, 41 Tums 672, 68o (1963);
authorities cited note zo supra.
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for the kind of macroeconomic model that I am suggesting.
Having worked out in this way an approximation of the "ideal"
distribution of the tax burden, it would be possible to test alter-
native reform programs to see which comes closest to the
"ideal." 87 The "best" practical program, on this theory, would
not be the one that elimirnated the most "preferences," but the one
whose tax burden distribution was closest to the ideal.
This method of judging the proximity of a proposal to the
professed ideal would recognize that unavoidable preferences
(those compelled by limitations in valuation techniques, antici-
pated problems in compliance, and similar factors) might be offset
by deliberately preserving (or even creating) other preferences.
It has often been pointed out that the elimination of an exclusion
would serve no purpose if it is so equally distributed that the tax
burden would be unaffected by the tidier system resulting from
the change. I am suggesting nothing more than a generalized ap-
plication of this well-known principle. If the tax base is to con-
tinue to exclude gifts and bequests, annual net worth increases,
and imputed income from personal property, for example, the
continued exclusion of unemployment compensation, social
security payments, and similar items may distribute the tax bur-
den more equitably (using the Haig-Simons definition as the
touchstone) than a reform program that adds the latter category
of items to the base.
"
7 Such a study would employ the computer techniques pioneered by J. Pech-
man and described in his A NEw TAx MODEL FOR REvENuE EsTMATI'TN (r965), and
applied in B. ONER, INCOmE DisamuTIoN AND TNE FEDERAL I.Nco=rx TAX (1966).
The study proposed by the ABA Committee on Substantive Tax Reform of the
Section of Taxation, go ABA RxP. 289, 295 (1965), will be a step in the right
direction if it is rigorous enough in its conception of a "broad income tax base."
The proposed study ought to examine the effect of "preferences" on both "hori-
zontal" and "vertical" equity (that is, within each income bracket and as among
brackets, respectively). There may be "preferences" that, taken in combination,
produce a distribution of tax liabilities within certain brackets comparable to the
burden that would result from a more rigorous application of the Haig-Simons
definition; and other combinations of "preferences" may have a similar effect as
among income brackets. Finally, there may be more elaborate combinations that
would perform the same function simultaneously for both the horizontal and
vertical planes.
I do not wish to minimize the difficulties; to satisfy everyone, the study would
have to offer a series of "ideal" distributions of the tax burden, each based on its
own assumptions about the proper way to resolve the definitional issues in the
concept of income. Moreover, since we lack information on the size and distribu-
tion of many items that are not now reflected on tax returns, a good deal of esti-
mating ingenuity would be required. One of the dangers, of course, in the avail-
ability of some information in a form that permits easy computer use is that items
that are not "machine-handleable" will be disregarded. See Spengler, Machine-
Made Justice: Some Implications, 28 LAw & CONTEasMnT. PROB. 36, 44-45 (1963).
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(5) There are many problem areas in which the search for
"preferences" is doomed to fail because we cannot confidently say
which provisions are "rules" and which are "exceptions." In these
areas, we cannot comply with Blum's advice to "lean over back-
ward" to avoid "preferences" 88 because, in the absence of a
generally acceptable or scientifically determinable vertical, we
cannot know whether we are leaning forward or backward. The
central source of difficulty is the fact that the income tax structure
cannot be discovered, but must be constructed; it is the final re-
sult of a multitude of debatable judgments.
If we were dealing not with an income tax but with a tax whose
label described its reach with greater precision, an "exception"
would be easier to identify. For example, in constructing a poll
tax, we would have at the outset a consensus on what constitutes a
natural person whose "head" is to be taxed. To be sure, even here
there would be marginal cases - conceived but unborn children,
persons who have been legally declared dead but who reappear,
Siamese twins, and so on. These peripheral cases aside, a con-
sensus on the base to which the tax is to be applied would be
feasible, and it would warrant the use of terms like "exception"
and "preference" to describe proposals to exempt from the tax
such persons as children, foreign tourists and diplomats, or in-
competents. And one could say of proposals to exempt soldiers on
combat duty, Boy Scout leaders, or persons over the age of sixty-
five or blind that, however meritorious such "preferences" might
be when considered individually, there would be no satisfactory
criteria for exempting one group of meritorious persons while re-
fusing to exempt other persons such as Peace Corps workers,
nurses, or the unemployed. Under these circumstances, it could
be persuasively argued that a "pure" tax base would be a fortress
that could be effectively defended against all comers, no matter
how appealing their claims. When we turn to the field of income
taxation, however, we do not begin with a consensus on the mean-
ing of income, but with a myriad of arguments about what should
be taxed, when, and to whom. The CTB concept is simply
irrelevant to many of these issues - the taxable unit, the taxable
period, the personal-business borderline, and others - and hence,
notwithstanding the contrary assumption of some commentators,
it can make no contribution to the elimination of "preferences"
from these areas.
8
" See note 3 supra.
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